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An evaluation of the award fee determination process in
Cost-Plus-Award- Fee (CPAF) contracts is conducted in an
attempt to improve the process. Improvements are needed and
are possible. An analysis of pre-award activities and the
development and structuring cf contract elements which
influence the award fee determination process is first
conducted. These elements and activities include the formu-
lation of the base fee, determining how the award fee pool
is used, formulating the evaluation criteria, determining
the length of the evaluation period and, development cf an
appropriate formula to compute the fee. The second step
involves contract administration functions in terms of eval-
uation and fee determination procedures. Included is an
examination of the Performance Evaluation Board composition
and proceedings as well as the role and authority of the Fee
Determination Official. Finally, an examination of data for
trend analysis is conducted and concludes that award fees
are generally too high.
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I. IHTRODPCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This thesis will focas on the evaluation of the award
fee determination process in Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
contracts. The conceptual framework for CPAF contracts vras
formed in the late 1950' s and early 1960 's- The Navy was
one of the first Agencies to use CPAF contracts in the early
1960 's. Because the award fee deter niination is subjective
,
unilateral, and post performance decision on the part of the
Government, the amount of the award fee and the process by
which the award fee is determined is subject to criticism
from internal Navy sources. Congress and industry. An
attempt will be made to evaluate the award fee determination
process to explore how it might be improved in order to
ensure the Government pays a "fair and reasonable" price.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this research effort is to study and
evaluate the award fee determination process in major weapon
systems acquisition in an attempt to improve the process.
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The research questions which, if answered, would achieve
the objective are as follows;
1. Primary question:
What are the key characteristics of the award tee
determination process under CPAf contracts for major
weapon systems and hew might this process be
improved?
2. Subsidiary questions:
a) What are tie basic concepts and assumptions in the
award fee determination process?
b) What are the key criteria used to evaluate
contractor performance and how have these criteria
been utilized?
c) What are the significant issues and problems in
contractor performance evaluation?
d) What guidelines are used by the Fee Determination
Official in determining the quality of contrac-
tor's performance and amount of award fee?
e) What input does the contractor have in the award
fee determination process?
f) What modifications should be made to improve the
fee determination process?
g) How are funds utilized which remain in the "award
fee pool" after the award fee determination deci-
sion is made?
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h) The amount of the award fee is limited by the size
of the award fee pool. In measuring the award fee
as a percentage of the award fee pool, what
trends, if any, are evident?
C. SCOPE
This thesis will evaluate the award fee determination
process and award fee concept as used with CPAF contracts in
major weapon systems acquisition within the Department of
the Navy. While many topics could be discussed concerning
CPA? contracts, this thesis will focus only on the award fee
determination process in structuring the award fee in the
CPAF contract and in the proper administration of the
contract. This process will te examined in detail in an
attempt to make recommendations for improving the process.
D. STDDI LIMITATIOHS AHD ASSUMPTIONS
The research will be limited by the accessability of
data available from the academic environment. Naval Material
Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Sea Systems
Command, and the willingness of private contractors to
cooperate.
The following assumptions have been made in the research
process:
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1. That the original decision to use a CPA? contract was
proper and that the contract t/pe for the the partic-
ular situation used is net to be addressed.
2. That the contracts selected for examination are
representative of the total CPAF contract population.
3. That the findings and recommendations are appropriate
for other Agencies to consider and are not strictly
Navy oriented.
E. METHODOLOGY
The literature concerning the development and use of
award fee contracts, specifically CPAF contracts, is exam-
ined in this thesis. Sources for this literature were
General Accounting Office audit reports. Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange, Air Force Business Besearch
Management Center, Naval Postgraduate School library, and
the Administrative Sciences Department library.
Interviews were conducted and data obtained from
personnel in the following positions and for the following
purposes:
!• Fee Determination Officials to examine the decision
making process used to determine the amount of the
award fee, management of the award fee pool, review
inputs received from Performance Evaluation Board
15
members, and gain insight into the degree of accept-
ance of the award fee contract.
2. Members of Performance Evaluation Boards to examine
their level of acceptance and assumptions inherent in
the award fee process.
3. Contract policy staff members at the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy and Naval Material Command to
evaluate major factors, characteristics, and basic
concepts of the award fee process.
4. Contractor representatives to gain insight into
contractor's views toward the award fee process.
Data from eighteen CPAF contracts representing four
different Project Offices was obtained for review and anal-
ysis. The approximate total cost estimate for these
eighteen contracts exceeded 52.27 1 billion. These data were
provided to the researcher by evaluation period, and
included the amount of funds available in the award fee pool
to be awarded during the evaluation period and the amount
actually awarded. Included in the eighteen contracts were




The first half of this research effort is designed
around what is available in the literature. Chapter II
presents some historical background of CPAF contracts; the
conceptual framework as seen in the literature covering the
elements of an award fee contract, the evaluation criteria,
and the award procedures; followed by tne applications and
advantages as well as disadvantages of CPAF contracts.
Chapter III is designed to give the reader some background
on using profit as a motivational tool. If award fee
contracts are intended to motivate the contractor, then it
behooves Contracting Officers and others interfacing with
the contractor to understand the driving forces which moti-
vate the contractor.
The second half of the thesis resulted from conducting
interviews and gathering data from the various individuals
contacted. Chapter IV addresses the concerns and elements
used when structuring a CPAF contract. These are pre-award
concerns which the Project Manager and Contracting Officer
would want to address in formulating the contract and
submission for a pre-business clearance. Such elements as
the base fee, award fee pool, evaluation criteria, evalua-
tion period length, and fee computation formulas are
discussed. Chapter V addresses the issues and concerns
17
involved with administering CPAF contracts. Items of
interest include the Performance Evaluation Board composi-
tion and proceedings, as well as the role and authority of
the Fee Determination Official. Chapter V concludes with an
examination of trend analysis of award fees from data gath-
ered during the course of research interviews.
Chapter VI is designed to summarize the research by
reaching conclusions, making research recommendations,
responding to the research questions, and making recommenda-
tions for further study.
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II. BACKGEODND AND QONCEPTDAL FRAMESORK
A- INTBODUCTION
The Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract is a member of
the family of cost- reimbursable contracts with special fee
provisions, CPAF contracts are characterized by the unique
method in whicii the amount of the contractor's fee is deter-
mined. Generally, an award fee is an incentive that can be
paid by the Government to a contractor. The objective of
the award fee provision clause in a contract is to encourage
the contractor to surpass the minimum acceptable performance
standards established for certain areas that are described
by what is referred to as the "evaluation criteria." A CPAF
contract provides a means of applying an incentive to
contracts which are not susceptible to a finite measurement
of performance necessary for structuring most incentive
contracts, and as such, require a subjective evaluation.
The fee established in a CPAF contract consists of two
parts. The first part is a base (or fixed) fee. Award fee
guidelines allow the contractor to receive a base fee which
does not vary with contract performance. The size of the
base fee will be discussed later in this chapter. An award
19
fee contract also provides for a maxiinum fee. The differ-
ence ietween the maxiiDuin fee and base fee is referred to as
the "award fee pool." The amount of the pool awarded to the
contractor is contingent upon the level of contractor
performance during a pre-specified performance period,
usually three to six months. This award amount is intended
to provide motivation for the contractor to excel in various
areas of contract performance such as quality, timeliness,
ingenuity, and cost effectiveness. The amount of award fee
awarded to the contractor may te all that is available in
the award fee pool or only a part of that which is avail-
able. The exact amount is based upon a subjective evalua-
tion of the quality of the contractor's performance, judged
on the basis of criteria originally included in the
contract. The award fee is determined by the Government
representatives in a unilateral decision, which is not
subject to the Disputes Clause of the contract [ Ref . 1].
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce this rela-
tively new type of contract by reviewing the historical
background, the conceptual framework necessary for struc-
turing a CPAF contract, situations/conditions under which
CPAF contracts are appropriate for use, and advantages and
disadvantages of CPAF contracts.
20
B. HISTORICAL BACKGECOND
Variants of award fee provisions were first i nif lemented
in Federal Government aircraft maintenance and overhaul
contracts during the late 1950's [Ref. 2]. During the
period 1958 through 196 1, Professor Frederic H. Scherer, of
Harvard University, participated as a faculty team member in
the Weapons Acquisition Research Project which was commis-
sioned by the Ford Foundation to explore the relationship
between industry and the Government in weapon systems acqui-
sition. Professor Scherer was the first to publish recom-
mendations for the use of "After the Fact Evaluation in
Profit Determination" in 1962- It was his belief that award
fee provisions would be particularly useful in the research
and development (R S D) phases of major systems acquisition
programs where determining costs, product quality, and
schedules in advance of performance was difficult [Ref. 3].
As such, in this researcher's opinion. Professor Scherer may
well be considered the "father of CPAF contracting."
/ In addition to Professor Scherers' work, several other
independent planning actions were considering the use of
award fee contracts during 1961 and 1962. Both the Navy and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were
negotiating award fee contracts in 1962 [Ref. 66]. NASA is
actually credited with being the pioneer in CPAF
21
contracting. The Navy's logistic support contract for oper-
ations at Kwajalein Island, effective in July 1962, combined
a cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) arrangement for cost
control with an award fee provision for a subjective evalua-
tion of staffing control, personnel turnover, and quality of
performance [Ref. 5]- On 1 March 1964, the 0-S. Navy
Purchasing Office, los Angeles, awarded the Navy's first
"pure" CPAF contract for operation and maintenance of
instrumentation systems and test range facilities [Hef. 6 ]-
In addition to the Navy, NASA also played an active
role in the development of CPAF contracts. The Goddard
Space Flight Center first negotiated a CPAF contract
covering operation, maintenance, and engineering services
for the Mercury Manned Space Flight Network. Although this
was the first CPAF contract negotiated, it did not become
effective until 1 January 1963. NASA's first CPAF contract
to actually be awarded was dated 1 October 1962. This
contract was negotiated by the Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office, Cleveland, Ohio, and covered research and develop-
ment efforts for a Nuclear Powered Socket Engine (NERVA)
[Ref. 7].
The Armed Services Procurement Regulation Committee
originally approved the use of CPAF contracts for experi-
mental purposes within the Department of Defense (DOD) in
1963 £Ref. 8]. It is not clear to the researcher how the
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Navy was able to award a ccntract for the support of
Kwajalein Island with award fee provisions in 1962; it may
have been an individual Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) authorized deviation with the ASPR
committee later deciding to allow a class deviation for
everyone on an experimental basis, however support for this
theory could not be found. At first, use of CPAF contracts
were thought to be viable only in lev el-of- effort type
contracts; with the first five applications of CPAF
contracts under the test used for procurement of technical,
engineering, and support services [fief. 9]. The Navy
expanded use of CPAF contracts within two and one-half years
following the test approval to include the procurement of
research and development, naval architectural design, and
construction [Ref. 10]- The researcher believes that this
expansion by the Navy of CPAF contract use into the area of
research and development may be directly attributable to
Professor Scherer*s earlier work in this area.
During the first four years of experience with award fee
provisions, a total of 140 DOD and NASA contracts, valued in
excess of $1.1 billion, were awarded to nearly 90 civilian
contractors [Ref. 11]. While NASA and all DOD Agencies
(Departments of the Army, Air Force and Navy) used CPAF
contracts in the early years, the Navy and NASA appeared to
be the pioneers and made the most extensive use of this
contract type.
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The CPAF contract is gaining acceptance within both the
Government and industry. During Fiscal Year (FY) 1982/ CPAF
contracts were used in one-half of one percent of all DOD
contracts in excess of $10, 000 ^ which also represents 3,5
percent of net dollar valu€ of FY 1982 contracts.
Additionally, in FY 1982, CPAF contracts represented 7.4
percent of the net dollar value of all Navy contracts. CPAF
contracts as a percentage of total numbers of contracts in
excess of $10,000 used by the Navy was 1.5 percent in FY1982
[Eef. 12]. The differences between the percentages indi-
cates that the award fee contracts represented a larger
dollar value than the averag^e" contract.
According to the DOD and NASA Incentive Con tractin g
Guiii^/ "the objective of an incentive contract is to moti-
vate the contractor to earn more compensation by achieving
better performance and controlling costs" [Ref. 13], The
NASA Cost Plus Award Fee Contracting Guide indicates that
experience has shown that CPAF contracts have generated
tangible beneficial and motivational responses, both from
Government and industry. Communications, in particular,
have become more effective between the Government and the
contractor. In addition, the CPAF concept has demanded and
has resulted in improved definition of tasks (Statement of
Work) ; both Government and industry have used CPAF proce-
dures as management tools to communicate to supervisory,
administrative, and operating levels [Ref. 14],
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since its conception in the late 1950's and early
1960 *s, use of the CPAf concept has grown to represent a
powerful management tool. The researcher believes that the
increase in use of CPAF contracts, to 3.5 percent of the net
DOD dollar value for FY 1982 contracts, indicates that
industry has tegun to accept the subjective evaluation
process inherent in the concept.
C. CONCEPTUAL FBAMEWCBK
Now that we have examined historical development, how is
a CPAF contract structured?
1 . Elements of an Award Fee Contract
In its simplest form, a CPAF contract will contain
the folloving elements: estimated cost, base fee, maximum
fee, award periods, and evaluation criteria.
Estimated costs should be negotiated on a fair and
equitable basis between the Government and contractor, and
should represent the best estimate of what actual costs will
be upon completion of performance. Estimated costs are
analogous to target costs in a CPIF contract.
The base fee is the minimum dollar amount of fee
that a contractor can earn on a CPAF contract and may in
fact be zero. The base fee is designed to provide the
25
contractor with an adequate fee for perxorming to the
minimum standards. As such, the Lase fee is synonymous with
the minimum fee on a CPU contract. However, the DOD
Supplement to the Federal Acguisition Regulations (FAR)
limits the amount of the base fee to three percent of esti-
mated costs [Bef. 26].
As mentioned earlier, the difference between the
base fee and maximum fee is called the award fee pool and is
that amount available for award to the contractor on the
basis of the results of periodic evaluations. The award fee
pool should be allocated to the evaluation periods in
proportion to the level of effort expected to be required
during each period.
The maximum fee can be described as the base fee
plus the amount in the award fee pool. The controlling
requirement limiting the size of the maximum fee is the
regulatory limitation that this fee will not exceed the
statutory limitation on cost reimbursement contracts;
namely, 15 percent of target (estimated) costs for research
and development efforts, six percent for architectural or
engineering services related to public works functions, and
10 percent for all other types cf contracts [Ref. 27]. This
means that if the minimum fee is established at three
percent (the maximum allowed) , then the award fee amount is
limited to 12 percent of estimated costs for research and
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development efforts, three percent for architectural or
engineering services, and seven percent for all other types
of contracts.
Ihe award periods must be long enough to cover
sufficient work to enable a reasonable base upon which to
develop the evaluation, but shcrt enough to allow feedback
to the contractor during performance. An evaluation period
of three months may be too short to justify in that the
increased administrative effort necessary to make the evalu-
ations becomes too much of an administrative burden. An
evaluation period of a four or six month length may be more
appropriate.
2. Establishing, the Evaluation Criteria
The evaluation criteria and standards for making the
award are the basis for the ultimate award. The evaluation
criteria set forth the elements of the contractor's perform-
ance which will be used by the Government in determining the
award amount. The greatest challenge with a CPAP contract
lies in the quality of the evaluation criteria structure and
the rating plan. The importance of a well-defined, well-
written evaluation plan cannot be over-emphasized. The
evaluation criteria should identify the weighting of various
factors and include guidance as to the level of performance
required for specific rating levels. The DOD Supplement to
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the FAR requires that the evaluation criteria be included in
the contract [Bef. 28].
While the evaluation criteria must be fully under-
stood by the contractor, the selection of criteria is not a
subject of negotiation in some agencies. The final selec-
tion is a unilateral decision by some Government Agency
negotiators [Ref. 29]. The advantage of the unilateral
issuance of evaluation criteria is that they can be changed
by the Government during contract performance if it becomes
necessary, in the Government's opinion, to redirect the
contractor's emphasis.
In general, the evaluation criteria should be fair
and reasonable measures of performance in key areas. They
should also be flexible to enable adaptation to a changing
environment while continuing to motivate the contractor to
improve performance.
Performance criteria in award fee contracts must be,
by definition, subjective. Tc properly choose appropriate
performance criteria, it is necessary to command a thorough
knowledge of both managerial as well as technical areas of
the project.
No two evaluation and rating plans will be identical
in all respects; each must be tailored to the specific needs
and requirements. In addition, evaluation criteria should
be tailored to a limited number of key elements which are
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critical to the project's success. Examples of key elements
might include technical, quality, managerial, schedule, cost
control, and personnel utilization. Once the key elements
are d€cided upon, these categories may be further divided
into criteria for evaluating the elements that make up each
performance category. The inclusion of sub-elements is also
a feasible alternative. Appendix B contains the example of
award criteria provided in DOD Supplement to the FAR,
section 16.404-2.
Because the Government is more interested in results
rather than effort, evaluation criteria should be geared to
evaluating "output" rather than "input" [Ref . 30 ]. As such,
the criteria selected must represent attainable goals;
otherwise the motivation to the contractor may be lost.
There are many methods for establishing rating plans
and evaluation criteria. As mentioned earlier, no two
systems will be identical; a system must be selected which
best fits the requirement. The system of standards most
commonly used is the adjective-type standard rating system
which indexes a performance quality adjective and corre-
sponding explanation to a percentage of the potential award
fee available during the evaluation period [Ref. 31], While
Appendix 3 shows one example recommended by the DOD
Supplement to the FAR, the following is an example of an
adjective evaluation standards system recommended by NASA:
[Ref. 32]
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1. Excellent: Represents 91 to 100 percent of the
potential award fee. Performance is outstanding in most
respects, approaching the best that could be performed
by a qualified contractor. Contractor has greatly
exceeded quality/ schedule, output and overall perform-
ance which would be expected of an average contractor.
Areas of deficiency are very few and relatively unimpor-
tant in nature. Contractor shows initiative in
executing job and invoking improvements.
2. Good: Represents 81 to 90 percent of the potential
award fee. Performance is substantially better than
standards. Contractor has mere than met all needs, has
substantially improved upon quality and schedules, has
exceeded the performance expected of an average
contractor. Areas of deficiency are relatively few and
are more than offset by areas of above average or excel-
lent performance.
3. Satisfactory: Represents 71 to 80 percent of the
potential award fee. Performance is adequate, overall.
Contractor has met all needs, schedule, and expectations
in a fashion which corresponds to standard performance
by a qualified contractor. Areas of deficiency are
about offset by areas of above standard performance.
U. Marginal: Represents 61 to 70 percent of the poten-
tial award fee. Performance is below the standard
performance expected of a qualified contractor.
Contractor is deficient in a significant number of
areas. Performance in other areas is generally average,
with few or no areas of above average performance.
5. Unsatisfactory: Represents 60 percent or below the
potential award fee. Performance is deficient in
substantial areas of effort. Immediate improvement is
required in order to permit continuation of the
contract. Termination may be considered.
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D. TH2 AWARD PROCEDUHE
The award procedure is a three step process within the
contracting agency which begins with Government monitors
evaluating contractor performance during the reporting
period. Generally, the people used for this task are the
technical and business personnel who are monitoring the
contractor's work on a regular basis. These people may
include the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACC)
,
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditor, and other
on-site representatives. These people should be knowledge-
able cf the contract requirements, the evaluation criteria,
and technical areas. The goal of this part of 'the process
is to obtain the evaluation of the most knowledgeable
personnel in the agency on each area of the contractor's
performance. Findings of these individuals should be
consolidated into periodic reports and forwarded to an award
fee Performance Evaluation Board (PEB) . The frequency of
these reports will depend on the length of the evaluation
period, but, - in the author's opinion, should be either
monthly or quarterly.
Step two in this process is a review of these evalua-
tions by the PEB. The DOD Supplement to the FAR indicates
that this step is optional [Ref. 33]- As such, considera-
tion should be given to eliminating this step on smaller.
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less complex, procurements. If the PEB were utilized, its
function would be to review all evaluation reports and
subjectively determine a performance grade for each pre-
established evaluation criterion and an overall performance
grade for the period. The DOD Supplement to the FAR has a
recommended format for a contractor performance evaluation
report which is included in Appendix C for review [Ref. 34].
The third step is the actual award by the Award-fee
Determination Official (ADO) . This individual is also often
referred to as the Fee Determination Official (FDO) . If the
PEB is utilized, the PEB will forward the performance grade
and recommended award fee amount to the ADO. There are no
requirements which indicate that the recommended award fee
amount is binding on the ADO. The ADO must either accept
the PEB's recommendation, or determine a different award fee
amount. If a PEB is not utilized, the ADO must review the
evaluation reports and determine an award fee amount. In
major contracts, the ADO would te at the management level of
the procuring activity (usually the Project i^anager) , while
in smaller contracts, the contracting officer himself might
perform this function. Once the ADO makes the initial award
fee determination, a letter report is forwarded to the
contractor providing information on the performance grade
and corresponding award fee, and a listing of all areas of
performance improvement which, if incorporated, may result
32
in potential additional award fees in future periods
[Ref. 35]. The contractor has an opportunity to rebut the
ADO'S decision by presenting evidence in his favor
[Ref. 36]. However, once the AEO (and possibly in consulta-
tion with the PES) has reviewed the rebuttal and final award
fee determination made by the AEO, the decision is final and
not subject to dispute [Ref. 37].
E- APPLICATION OF COST-PLOS-AW AED-FEE CONTRACTS
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Department
of Defense Supplement to the FAR state that CPAF contracts
are suitable when; [Ref. 15 and 16]
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective
incentive targets applicable to cost, technical perform-
ance or schedule;
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives
will be enhanced by using a contract that effectively
motivates the contractor toward exceptional performance
and provides the Government with the flexibility to
evaluate both actual perfomance and the conditions
under which -it was achieved;
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost
required to monitor and evaluate performance are justi-
fied by the expected benefits;
(iv) Level of effort contracts for performance of
services where mission feasibility is established but
measurement of achievement must be by subjective evalua-
tion rather than objective measurement; and
(v) Work which would have been placed under another
type of contract if the performance objectives could be
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expressed in advance by definite milestones, targets or
goals susceptible of measuring actual performance.
The lAE does not place a minimum limit on the dollar
size of CPAF contracts. NASA uses a rule of thumb that:
[Ref. 18]
Contracts for less than 3100,000 may be placed on a CPAF
basis if the contractor is providing critical support
services or ¥hen the significance of contemplated
performance gains may far outweigh the additional admin-
istrative expense.
Although a minimum limit on the dollar size of CPAF
contracts is not imposed by DOD, the Chief of Naval Material
(NAVMAT) does indicate that "award fee contracts should not
generally be employed for contracts valued under $25
million" [Eef. 17]. Additionally, the FAR and BOD
Supplement to the FAR place the following limitations on
their use:
(i) All of the limitations in 16.301-3 are complied
withi
lA cost-reimbursement contract may be used when: (a)
The contractor's accounting system is adequate for deter-
mining costs applicable to the contract; (b) Appropriate
Government surveillance during performance will provide
reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective
cost controls are used; and (c) A determination and findings
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(ii) The maximum fee payat)l€ (i.e., the base fee plus
the highest potential award fee) complies with the limi-
tations in 15.903-ai2
(iii) The contract amount, performance period, and
expected benefits are sufficient to warrant the addi-
tional administrative effort and costs involved;
[Ref. 19]
(iv) The CPAF contract shall not be used as an adminis-
trative technique to avoid CPFF contracts when the
criteria for CPFF contracts apply, nor shall a CPAF
contract be used to avoid the effort of establishing
objective targets so as to make feasible the use of a
CPIF type contract;
(v) The CPAF contract shall not be used where the
contract amount, period of performance or the benefits
expected are insufficient tc warrant the additional
administrative effort or cost; and
(vi) The CPAF contract shall not be used for procure-
ments categorized as either Engineering Development or
Operational -System Development which have undergone
contract definition, except that where it may be more
advantageous to do so, it may be used in these catego-
ries for individual procureaents, ancillary to the
development of a major weapon system or equipment, where
the purpose of the procurement is clearly to determine
or solve specific problems associated with the major
weapon system or equipment. [Ref. 20]
has been executed, in accordance with agency procedures
showing that (1) this contract type is likely to be less
costly than any other type, or (2) it is impractical to
obtain supplies or services of the kind or quality required
without the use of this contract type.
2To be discussed later in this chapter.
35
It is important to note that if the cost of administra-
tion of a CPAF contract is in excess of any benefits which
may accrue to the Government, a contract form other than
CPAF should be utilized. The problem then becomes one of
how to measure the benefits and costs of administration;
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition,
award fee provisions should not be used when another
contract type would be more appropriate, such as when evalu-
ation criteria can be objectively measured. Such an example
would be a CPIF contract with multiple incentives.
It has been demonstrated that CPAF contracts are partic-
ularly appropriate for use in the procurement of support
services generally associated with base maintenance and
operations and mission support contracts. For example, the
researcher believes that it may be a viable option to use
CPAF provisions in the contracting out of base medical
support services under Office of Management and Budget (0MB)
Circular A-76. Another example would be the operation and
maintenance of the computer center at the Naval Postgraduate
School.
As will be seen in Chapter 17, the Navy has expanded the
use of CPAF contracts into the acquisition of major weapon
systems. The development phase of major weapon systems
acquisition appears to be well-suited for CPAF use. This
would also represent the largest dollar applications of CPAF
use.
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Although award fee provisiors are most commonly used in
CPAF contracts, use of the award fee concept is not limited
strictly to one contract type. Section 16.U04-2(c) of the
COD Supplement to the FAR provides some flexibility in the
use of this concept. There may be times when the
contracting officer desires to provide some form of motiva-
tion to the contractor which is both objective and subjec-
tive. For example, logistic support, quality, timeliness,
cooperation, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness are areas
under management control which may be evaluated only subjec-
tively, A contract in which the majority of the fee
(profit) is subject to a Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
arrangement and a minority is subject to an award fee
arrangement, would be termed a FPI/AF contract. A CPIF/AF
contract would be where the majority of the fee was subject
to a cost plus incentive arrangement with a minority subject
to an award fee arrangement.
P. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COST-PLUS-AWAED-FEE
CCHTEACTS
T • Advantages
The advantages of CPAF contracts are numerous and
varied. One advantage, identified by several interviewees,
is as a motivational management tool for both Government and
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industry resulting in improved horizontal and vertical
communication (i.e., between Government and industry as well
as up and down all levels of the corporate structure). One
Program Manager indicated that as a management tool, the
Government is more effectively able to influence the
contractor and project progress during the contract period.
Excellence by the contractor is rewarded with higher award
fees. Similarly, poor or substandard performance results in
lower award fees. Additionally, one Business/Financial
Manager pointed out that depending upon how the contract is
structured, the evaluation period may be of a short enough
duration that the contractor can receive "nearly instanta-
neous" feedback on his performance. The more timely the
feedback, the better it is fcr the contractor because it
allows timely adjustments by the contractor. This cause-
and-effect relationship between performance and profit can
result in the contractor making modifications to his proce-
dures to become more efficient, and hence earn higher award
fees during subsequent evaluation periods.
Even without profit as a motivator, the evaluation
itself can be a positive motivational tool. The award fee
evaluation can enhance the pride of the organization through
the managers and other employees [Ref- 21]. Just as indi-
viduals have basic and higher order needs that must be
satisfied (i.e., food, shelter, security, self esteem) , so
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too do corporations have needs. Once the firm's lower level
needs are satisfied (i.e., survival, profit, growth, market
share)
,
prestige becomes the primary motive. The award fee
acts as a corporate motivator to the extent that it is
perceived by the firm to affect its prestige.
The award fee concept also allows for management
flexibility, as pointed out by one Business/Financial
Manager. This flexibility can take several forms. Because
the amount of award fee determination is a subjective evalu-
ation, with performance being measured with predetermined
standards which keep changing, management can remain flex-
ible to take into consideration unexpected/unplanned circum-
stances while still allowing the contractor to earn up to
the maximum amount of the award fee, if appropriate. A
second form of flexibility in award fee contracts is the
Government's right to change the evaluation criteria in an
effort to redirect the contractor's emphasis. Still another
technique which provides flexibility to management is the
Government's ability to divide and assign the award fee to
various periods depending upon the milestones the Government
wishes to emphasize. The amount available in the award fee
pool need not be evenly divided among every evaluation
period. Likewise, depending upon how the contract is struc-
tured, any award fee available in the pool which is not
awarded during a particular evaluation period, may be either
39
carried forward to subsequent periods to provide for addi-
tional contractor motivation, or lost by the contractor and
removed from the pool. 3 The Government also has the flexi-
bility to determine the length of the evaluation periods.
However, care must be taken in making this determination.
Evaluation periods which are toe short will place an unnec-
essary administrative burden on the contract administrators
and other personnel. On the other hand, in the researcher's
opinion, an evaluation period which is too long reduces the
motivational aspects discussed earlier when the contractor
does not receive timely feedback.
NASA discovered that improved performance is not
limited to areas motivated in the award fee plan, but at
times extends to improvements en other Government contracts
currently in existence within the corporation [Eef. 22].
Called the "overflow" principle, NASA indicated that, "Once
a contractor begins making decisions in consonance with the
guidelines of the contract, the results of related nonincen-
tivized contracts also improve" [Eef. 22].
Still another advantage, in the researcher's
opinion, is that use of a CPAF contract forces the prepara-
tion of a well-defined Statement of Work (SOW)
.
The
3The Navy recently restricted use of the carry forward
feature in NAVMAT Instruction 4280. laof 10 July 1984. This
will be further examined in Chapter IV when discussing use
of the award fee pool.
40
contractor, realizing that his award fee depends upon satis-
fying the desired emphasis to be placed on specific perform-
ance areas, benefits from more explicit direction than he
would have received under a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF)
contract. In developing the SOW, the contractor seeks
higher fees through better perfcrmance and the Government is
looking for the best possible standards against which to
make the required evaluations.
Still another advantage, for the contractor, is that
a CPAF contract provides the ability to earn higher fees.
While most CPFF service contracts earn a 7 or 8 percent fee,
a well structured CPAF contract can provide fees from 10 to
12 percent for superior performance [Ref. 23]- As indicated
by a number of interviewees, this has led some people to
refer to CPAF contracting as a "give away" program.
One last advantage is that CPAF contracts can be
used by contractor management as a motivational tool for the
corporate employees [Eef. 24]- Dr. Arthur C. Meiners advo-
cates development of a system which would allow employees
working to support a CPAF contract to participate directly
in the award fee process with bcnus payments. As the amount
of the award fee increases, so would the financial rewards
to the various employees. Such a contract would be called
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee, Employee Participation, CPAF(EP).
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2 • Disadvantages
Disadvantages for the use of CPAF contracts do
exist. Perhaps the one major disadvantage, as identified by
one Cost Analyst, is the extensive Government organization
necessary to properly administer the contract. Contractor
performance must be monitored closely by technically quali-
fied personnel who are knowledgeable of the requirement for
fairness and impartiality, the intent of the incentives, and
how evaluations will be used. They must also have the time,
motivation and guidance to prepare evaluations which are
meaningful to both the Government and the contractor.
Evaluators must understand that their function is to eval-
uate the contractor, not become a participatory member of
the contractor's management team. They must also be knowl-
edgeable of the technical performance required by the
contract. If the Government does not have the necessary
resources available for commitment to properly administer a
CPAF contract, some other contract type should be utilized.
This disadvantage highlights a need which is not
currently being satisfied. Numerous personnel interviewed
for this research pointed out that a formalized training
program for CPAF contracts does not exist. This is particu-
larly cri£ical with CPAF contracts because of their unique
features. Personnel working with award fee contracts must
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he trained in terms of contractcr motivation factors, evalu-
ation criteria and methods, contract administration tech-
niques, potential for abuse and misuse, responsibilities of
those who monitor contractor performance and provide inputs
and testimony to the PEB, as well as other factors unique to
CPAF contracts. Structuring such a training program and
manual is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Timely evaluation is also a critical factor as indi-
cated by a number of inter vie wees. The Government must
conduct the evaluation, determine the amount of fee to be
awarded, and notify the contractor of the results in a
timely manner. Delays in this process will result in the
contractor losing motivation for increasing efficiency.
As will be discussed later, an award fee contract
does not have a target fee as one of its elements. Because
of this, the Government must fully fund the amount of the
maximum award fee. Failure to do so will signal to the
contractor that the full amount of the award fee is impos-
sible to attain [Eef. 25]. In an environment ox tight
budgets, it is unrealistic to expect that a Program Manager
would, or could, request additional funding in order to
reward the contractor. Failure to fully fund the maximum
award fee will also send a signal to the evaluators that the
reduced figure is what the Government really had in mind as
the maximum from the beginning. In addition, it just makes
for sound business management to fully fund the project.
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G. CONCLUSION
Use of the award fee concept is continuing to grow since
its conception in the late 1950»s and initial utilization in
the early 1960* s. The CPAF contract can be an effective
incentive techni^^ue when understood and properly applied.
However, because the evaluation process is subjective and
the determination of award fee amount a unilateral decision/
success of the award fee concept depends on the Government's
ability to maintain the credibility and integrity of the
evaluation process. In addition, the award fee concept
demands the active support of both the Government and
contractor personnel to properly administer the contract and
manage the unique administrative requirements. Lack of
complete management support and the failure to iuaintain the
credibility and integrity of the evaluation process, quickly
reduces the effectiveness of the award fee contract.
An unbiased, fair, and reasonable measure of performance
is also critical to the success of the CPAF concept. The
contractor must be properly motivated to strive for more
efficient and better performance in an effort to receive a
higher award fee. The unilateral selection of evaluation
criteria by some Government Agencies is of concern to the
researcher- In order to be "fair and reasonable" to both
the Government and to the contractor, the contractor should
have an input into the development of evaluation criteria.
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In an attempt to tetter understand how award fees can be
used as an incentive (or motivating) tool, it is first
necessary to recognize those factors with which the
contractor can in fact be motivated. In the researcher's
opinion/ the DOD profit policy assumes that profit (or award
fee) alone is enough to motivate the contractor. Is this
really the case? Are there not other factors which can act
to motivate the contractor? These questions will be exam-
ined in Chapter III.
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III. PROPIT AS A MOTIVATIONAL TOOL
A. IHTBODUCTION
The below paragraphs represent the Government's profit
policy as it currently exists in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR)
:
It is in the Government's interest to offer contractors
opportunities for financial rewards sufficient to (1)
stimulate efficient contract performance, (2) attract
the best capabilities of qualified large and small busi-
ness concerns to Government contracts, and (3) maintain
a viable industrial base.
Both the Government and contractors should be concerned
with profit as a motivator of efficient and effective
contract performance. Negotiations aimed merely at
reducing prices by reducing profit, without proper
recognition of the function of profit, are not in the
Government's interests. Negotiation of extremely low
profits, use of historical averages, or automatic appli-
cation of predetermined percentages of total estimated
costs do not provide proper motivation for optimum
contract ji-erf ormance. With the exception of statutory
ceilings on profit and fee, agencies shall not (1)
establish administrative ceilings or (2) create adminis-
trative procedures that could be represented to contrac-
tors as de facto ceilings [Ref- 38].
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This policy statement is supijiemented with a Department
of Defense (DOD) statement as iniicated below:
Furthermore, low average profit rates on defense
contracts overall are detrimental to the public
interest. Effective national defense in a free enter-
prise economy requires that the best industrial capabil-
ities be attracted to defense contracts. These
capabilities will be driven away from the defense market
if defense contracts are characterized by low profit
opportunities. Consequently, negotiations aimed merely
at reducing prices by reducing profits, with no realiza-
tion of the function of profit, cannot be condoned. For
each contract in which profit is negotiated as a sepa-
rate element of the contract price, the aim of negotia-
tion should be to employ the profit motive so as to
impel effective contract performance by which overall
costs are economically controlled. To this end, the
profit objective must be fitted to the circumstances of
the particular acquisition, giving due weight to each of
the effort, risk, facilities investment, and special
factors set forth (in weighted guidelines) . This will
result in a wider range of profits which, in many cases,
will be significantly higher than previous norms
[Ref. 39].
The above policy statements indicate that it is the
Government's belief that profit is the basic motivating
force behind the contractor. There is an implied assumption
on the part of the Government that the contractor will be
properly motivated if given the opportunity to increase his
profits. The contractor, by accepting the contract, appears
to be agreeing with the Government.
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Brigadier General Bernard L. Weiss, 'JSAF, recently indi-
cated that large corporate DOD contractors should be treated
as "public utilities" and implied that these corporate
giants have a monopoly over the supply of their unique
defense product while the consumer (DOD) has little if any
power over the contractor to refuse the product at the
contractor's price once Congress has authorized the program
and appropriated funds. [Bef- UO]. Furthermore, General
"Weiss indicated that corporate profit goals are to attain
adequate levels, not adequate rates.
Herein lies the dilemma. Are contractors strictly moti-
vated by the "profit motive" as the Government's profit
policy implies, or are the contractors motivated by some
other forces? Clearly, it is the belief of Government and
DOD policy makers that profit maximization is the prime
industry motivater for improved performance. Additionally,
it is clear that it is DOD's intention to use profits to
motivate contractor performance. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the profit motive and examine those
forces which act to motivate and influence contractor's
performance.
To gain a better understanding of the present profit
policy, it would be helpful tc briefly examine the histor-
ical development of this policy.
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B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, purchasing tiy the Government has been on
the basis of price competition and, as such, negated any
need for a profit policy. It was felt that the competition
in the market place among independent contractors would
result in the Government receiving a fair and reasonable
price [Ref- 41 ].
Cost-plus-percen tage-of-cost (CPPC) contracts were used
regularly during the 1930 »s. A general lack of competition
resulted in an increase in the number of contracts negoti-
ated on either expected or actual costs [Ref. 42]. In a
CPPC contract, the profit or fee is determined by applying a
fixed percentage to the costs incurred. Therefore, as costs
increased, so did profits. If costs decreased, profits also
fell. The contractor was therefore motivated to actually
increase his costs! Responding to public pressure. Congress
passed numerous legislative actions designed to control
abuses such as CPPC contracts. For example, the
Vinson-Trammeli Act of 1934 limited profits to ten percent
on Navy ships and aircraft and required audits and inspec-
tions of contractor records [Ref. 43].
The potential for contractor fraud, waste and abuse
surfaced again during World War II with a shortage of
supplier capacity, resulting in the Renegotiation Act of
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1942. This Act called for the ranegotia tion of both prime
and subcontracts in excess of $100,000 and made possible the
recovery of excessive profits along with unallowable costs.
The Eenegotia tion Board also established profit as a
percentage of sales en individual contracts as the measure
of profitability.
1 • ^Ili:ii§.i Policy Stateme nt
The first formalized policy statement addressing
profit appears to have been included in the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 which states that for negotiated
contracts:
The fee for performing a cost-plus-a-fixed-f se contract
for experimental, developmental, or research work may
not be more than 15% of the estimated cost of the
contract, not including the fee. The fee for performing
a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for architectural or
engineering services for a public work or utility plus
the cost of these services to the contractor may not be
more than 6% of the estimated cost of that work or
project, not including the fee. The fee for performing
any other cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract may not be more
than 10!^ of the estimated ccst of the contract, not
including the fee [Ref. 44].
There were no statutory limits placed on profits under fixed
price contracts, except on those which may have been consid-
ered as "excessive" by the Renegotiation Act.
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A more general profit pclicy statement also appeared
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) in 1SU7
as:
The Department of Defense must apply contracting poli-
cies and methods designed to create an environment in
which industry can realize profits on defense business
which are high enough to give reasonable assurance of
long term availability to DOD industrial support by the
best companies and to enable those defense contractors
to attract sufficient eguity and borrowed capital
[Bef. 45].
During the 1950 *s, the profit policy outlined in
ASPR developed into a narrative form which lacked specific
guidance on the relationship between profit elements to be
considered when arriving at the appropriate profit level for
negotiated contracts. Nine profit elements were identified
as:
1. Effective competition;
2. Degree of risk;
3. Nature of work to be performed;
4. Extent of Government assistance;
5. Extent of contractor's investments;
6. Character of contractor's business;
7. Contractor performance;
8. Subcontracting; and
9. Unrealistic estimates [Bef. 46].
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The varied nature of these nine profit elements and amount
of sutjectivity inherent in evaluating each element without
specific guidelines made the contracting personnel's task
more difficult than was necessary. The predominant factor
was the "historical rate" established on previous contracts.
Contracting officers used the above nine profit elements
only to adjust profit rates to fit specific procurement
situations [Ref. 47].
Inadequacies in a formalized profit policy continued
and became visible in the early 1960 *s. The Senate
Committee on Government Operations (also known as the
McClellan Committee)/ whiJ-e investigating a DOD missile
program, found that primes and subcontractors were pyra-
miding profits and thus were teing paid unearned profits
[Ref. 48]. The results of this investigation and subsequent
publicity resulted in the Logistics Management Institute
(LHI) being tasked to study DOD's profit policy. The objec-
tive of this study was to:
Develop a rational, workable, uniform and equitable
approach to target profits which will result in a wider
range of profits. The study aims to develop specific
guidelines to assist contracting personnel in arriving
at appropriate profit rates to further national and
departmental interests utilizing the profit motive of
DOD contractors [Ref. 49].
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2 . geighted Gu idelin es
In August 1963, the Department of Defense imple-
mented for the first time the "weighted guidelines" approach
Ly revising the Armed Services Procurement Eegulation
[Ref. 50]. Weighted guidelines were a direct result of the
first LMI study [Ref- 51]. The guidelines were intended to
ensure consideration was made of the relative value of
appropriate factors in initial establishment of a profit or
fee objective. The evaluation factors to be considered
were:
1. Contractor input to total performance;
2. Contractual assumption of contract cost risk (type of
contract, reasonableness of cost estimates, diffi-
culty of contract task)
;
3. Record of contractor performance;
4. Selected factors (source of resources, special
achievement)
;
5. Special profit consideration (development of military
items without Government assistance) [Ref- 52]-
Although weighted guidelines were considered an
improvement over prior methods and represented a new method
to determine profit, three characteristics basic to the old
system remained intact. First, assignment of the basic fee
rate was based on the personal judgement of the contracting
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officer. Second, the fee rate was based on the estimated
cost of the contract. Finally, the fee rates failed to
consider the contractor investment in plant equipment or
working capital [Ref. 53]- Additionally, ASPR was again
revised to reflect the new profit policy:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to utilize
profit to stimulate efficient contract performance....
Negotiation of very low profits, the use of historical
averages or the automatic application of a predetermined
percentage to the total estimated cost of a product,
does not provide the motivation to accomplish such
performance.-.. The profit objectives must be fitted to
the circumstances of the particular procurement, giving
due weight to each of the performance, risk, and other
factors [Ref- 54].
Weighted guidelines drew mixed reactions and was the
subject of a great deal of study during the 1960* s and
1970*s. Concern existed over declining profits, low produc-
tivity within defense industries and an eroding industrial
base. In analyzing the results and impact of weighted
guidelines, a RAND Corporation study in 1969 concluded that:
1. Most firms had higher t arget fee rates after intro-
duction of the weighted guidelines approach, but
average realized fee rates ("coming-out" rates)
appear to have remained about the same.
5U
2. The weighted guidelines method resulted in spreading
the distribution of going-in target fee rates.
3- The objective was achieved, if the goal of the method
was to increase profit cpportunities, regardless of
whether or not they were achieved, by providing
higher levels cf target fees.
4. The goal was achieved, if the goal was to provide a
wider distribution of average fees.
5. The goal was not achieved, if the goal was to
increase actual fees, rather than target fees.
6. Eesults appear to have teen mixed and on the whole
unsuccessful, if the goal was to raise the profit-
ability of defense investment [Ref. 55],
It appears clear from the above discussion, in the research-
er's opinion, that the purpose and goals of the weighted
guidelines approach were not fully understood.
3. Irofit 76 (DPC 76::3)
The last significant study concerning profit and
profit policy was called "Profit '76". Chartered in May
1975 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations, William P. Clements, and chaired by Brigadier
General James W. Stansberry, the goal was to "develop any
policy revisions considered necessary to encourage private
investment in equipment and the associated reductions in
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cost" [Ref. 56]. This appears to be another way of saying
"reduce DOD ac^^uisition costs." The study eventually led to
a change in DOD regulations entitled Defense Procurement
Circular 76-3 (DPC 7 6-3) [Ref. 57].
Assistant Secretary Clements and Brigadier General
Stansberry recognized a need to conduct research to analyze
earnings and capital investments, determine contractors'
profitability in both defense and non-defense industries,
analyze contractor motivations leading to investments
designed to increase productivity and lower cost, and
finally, develop profit objectives designed to stop the
apparent erosion of the defense industrial base [Ref. 58].
The results of the study and DPC 76-3 made two major changes
to DOD*s profit policy in the hopes of raising the level of
contractor facility investments for the defense industry.
The first modification allowed the level of facility invest-
ment to be recognized by the Government contracting officer
in reaching a prenegotiation profit objective. Secondly, it
permitted the imputed interest cost of the contractor's
facility capital investment, as measured in accordance with
Cost Accounting Standard 414, to be used as an allowable
cost on most negotiated contracts [Ref- 59].
In the researcher's opinion^ DPC 76-3 appears to be
the groundwork for the weighted guidelines in use today.
While there have been additional changes made throughout the
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years, they have all been designed to adjust (increase or
decrease) weights assigned to various criteria used in
determining profit (i.e., DAC 7 6-23).
The same concerns which existed in the 1960 »s and
1970*s continue to exist today. As BADM J. S. Sansone, Jr.,
SC, DSN, indicated on 12 July 1984, recent research studies
have verified:
1. An eroding defense industrial base;
2. A limited surge/mobilization capability;
3. Capital investment in the Defense segment is low;
4. Productivity growth has heen very limited;
5- Profit policy (DAC 76-23) has not motivated contrac-
tors to make significant capital investments;
6. There are general misunderstandings of the DOD
finance policy, both within Government and the
private sector [Eef- 60].
According to RADM Sansone, the harsh realities experienced
by the D.S. industry are that operating profits have
declined while cost of capital has dramatically increased
[Ref. 60]. It is obvious that, in the researcher's opinion,




Profit has continued to be the driving force in
contractor motivation since the completion of the Profit 76
study in terms of a Department of Defense policy statement.
The Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) stated:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to utilize
profit to stimulate efficient contract performance.
Profit generally is the basic motive of business enter-
prise. The Government and defense contractors should be
concerned with harnessing this motive to work for more
effective and economical contract performance [Eef. 61].
"I • Profi t Maximization
In addition to DOD's profit policy, there appears to
be a great deal more support to indicate that profit maximi-
zation is the single most motivating factor for defense
industries. Most undergraduate and graduate level
economics/ finance, and business courses are structured
around the principle that a firm's desire is to maximize
profit. As Gerald T, Nielsen indicated, "most business
oriented decision makers today have been so ingrained with
the principles of profit maximization that the concept seems
almost intuitively obvious" £Ref. 62].
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Under the classical "profit maximization" assump-
tion, contractors are expected to shun lower fee effort in
favor of an arrangement that permits higher profit potential
[Eef. 63]. Dr. Peter Drucker, a strong advocate of the
classical profit motive/ indicates:
Production for profit is the principle of rationality
and efficiency on which the corporation must base
itself.... And the demand that some criterion other
than profitability be used as a determinant of economic
actions rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
economic process.... [Ref. 64]
In addition, Julius Jones and Russell Pierre, in an
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) thesis found profit
to be the prime industry motivator. Profit maximization
stood out as the single most important factor motivating the
fifty defense industry firms surveyed, with sales maximiza-
tion, firm perpetuation, and attainment of certain socioeco-
nomic goals identified as additional sub-goals [Ref. 65].
Finally, the DOD and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Incentive Contracting Guide states:
The profit motive is the essence of incentive
contracting. Incentive contracts utilize the drive for
financial gain under risk conditions by rewarding the
contractor through increased profit for attaining cost
(and sometimes performance and schedule) levels more
beneficial for the Government than expected and by
penalizing him through reduced profit for less than
expected levels [Ref. 66].
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2 • Sxtracontr actual Mot iv e
s
Contractors do not necessarily seek maximum profit
on every contract. liiere exist other motivational forces,
such as concerns for follow-on business, growth opportuni-
ties, or improvement of corporate image. These are often
called "extracontractual motivators" [Ref- 67]. The U.S.
Commission on Government Procurement indicated that:
[Ref. 67]
Sometimes extracontractual influences may operate in a
countervailing manner with the contractual objectives
specified in the contract. Government agencies gener-
ally accept the concept that these extracontractual
motivators are often beyond the control of the
Government.
But are they really beyond our control? What exactly are
these extracontractual motivating factors and cannot the
Government, once having identified them, use them to its own
advantage?
A study conducted by the Logistics Management
Institute (LMI) indicated that: [Ref. 68]
There is virtually unanimous agreement among managers
and analysts who have studied overall contractor motiva-
tion that, in the short run, contractor management does
sacrifice short run profit on defense business in favor
of achieving:
1. company growth,
2. increased share of the industry market.
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3. a tetter public image,
4. organizational prestige,
5. carry-over benefits to c cinmercial business (commer-
cial spinoffs)
,
6. greater opportunity for follow-on business, or
7. greater shareholder expectations for future growth
and profit.
Furthermore, the LMI study indicated that a company will be
willing to accept a less (or lower profit or fee) if doing
so will provide an opportunity to: [Ref. 59]
1. gain competitive advantage by engaging in develop-
mental effort in areas of potential future business,
2. acquire or retain competent personnel in scarce
disciplines,
3. spread fixed costs over a substantially broader
base, or
4. prevent a potential competitor from gaining entry to
the market
In summary, the LMI study states; £Eef. 70]
Whether management is operating in the company's
interest or for its own personal gain, it does not
attempt to maximize profit or fee on individual
contracts. It attempts to optimize among many objec-
tives, placing particular stress on those which
contribute most to maintaining or improving market posi-
tion and assuring the future strength of the firm. The
drive for profit is not absent, but is constrained by
aims which ultimately are more consequential.
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ririns do indeed have more objectives than just
profit. On any given contract, a contractor could have any
of a number of objectives in mind. All other things being
equal, a firm would tend to perform well on a contract it
had just signed- However, as Dr. Robert F. Williams pointed
out in a recent article entitled "So What Does the Defense
Contractor Really Want?", a firir has, as a higher order, its
own set of objectives and is first motivated to maximize its
own benefit-cost ratio [fief- 71]. A firm may for example,
find this ratio higher for the performance of one contract
than for a second contract in its plant at the expense of
the second, or it may find that completing a Government
contract could threaten its survival.
Dr. Williams' study indicated that Government
personnel perceive the order of importance of defense indus-
trial contractor objectives to be (in the order indicated)
profit on sales, company survival, improved cash flow,
development of dominant industry position, and return on
investment. These objectives were followed by company
growth, providing a good product, and finally public image
[Ref. 72].
On the other hand, industry beliefs about its objec-
tives were quite different. Industry personnel felt that
providing a good product was by far the most important
objective, followed by maintaining a long term continuing
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tusincss relationship^ improved cash flow^ profit, and
development of new capai)ilities. These were followed by
public image and finally the use of excess capacity
[Ref. 73].
The researcher believes that there should be more
weight given to the concept of public image as a motiva-
tional tool than either Government or contractors are
willing to accept. Quality has been neglected in American
industry over the years. Both Government and industry are
just now waking up to the need to improve quality. There
are a number of reasons for this, including: An increased
awareness for the critical need to improve reliability; to
be able to compete with foreign manufacturers; and the even-
tual cost savings through improved quality by reduced rework
time and less scrap. This idea of improving the "corporate
public image" through improved quality is also evidenced by
Ford Motor Company's theme of "Quality is Job 1" and the
introduction of "Quality Circles" into many of the nation's
industries.
Additionally, the researcher believes that corporate
prestige as a motivational tool should also be given
increased consideration, particularly when dealing with
award fee contracts. One senior Navy Department policy-
maker suggested that "corporate management views the Fee
Determination Official findings more as a report card than
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vhat the award fee contributed to the bottom line." Another
corporate officer for a large Navy contractor confirmed this
view, with some reservations, indicating that "the score, or
grade, is important to us; but I can't say that it's more
important than the size of the award from the (award fee)
pool . "
In their thesis. An Asses sment of Factors Which
Motivate Nav^ Contractors, Michael Jaggard and Howard
Cartwright indicated that contractor objectives can be
divided into contractual objectives and long term corporate
goals [Ref- 74]. They indicate that the two categories are
related in that the collective objectives of performing all
Government contracts must reflect the overall long term
corporate strategy. In addition, the following primary
contractual objectives of the Government contractor have all
been cited as prime business objectives: Company growth,
provide a good product, develop new skills, market share,
guarantee of follow on work, "mastery" (a desire to control
one's own destiny), risk aversion, safeguard proprietary
interests, utilize excess capacity, flexibility to customer,
and improved cash flow [Ref. 75].
Jaggard and Cartwright also identified three methods
to determine the contractual objectives of a contractor for
a specific contract [Ref- 75]. First, a post-performance
review of contractual outcomes and associated benefits to
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the contractor can be conducted. Inherent in this approach
is the necessity to wait until performance is completed to
conduct the review. Second, a list of possible contractual
objectives can be provided to the contractor who can be
requested to rate the relative importance of each objective
as it pertained to performance on recent contracts. This
"shopping list" approach may lead to biased responses. The
third method is simply to ask the contractor to list the top
three objectives that a firm hoped to attain by performing
the contract. The researcher suspects that a weakness in
this approach may occur if the contractor attempts to play
"mind games" by providing those objectives the contractors
think the Government wants to hear.
The researcher would also like to propose a fourth
method to determine contractor objectives. This method
involves evaluating the contractor in terms of his strengths
and weaknesses, the economic environment, the competitive
environment the contractor operates in, as well as the size
and maturity of the contractor. Each of these factors may
shed some light on the contractor's objectives in terms of
profit. For example, if the basic economy is in a recession
with relatively high unemployment in the industry, a
contractor may be willing to accept a lower profit and put
increased emphasis on corporate survival and maintaining his
labor force. Conversely, periods of economic growth may see
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defense contractors willing to accept additional risks in
the hopes of achievin*^ higher profits. Firms involved with
research and developaent activities may see the development
of new capai)ilities, maintaining a long term business rela-
tionship, and establishing a dominant industry position as
more important motivators than profit. Smaller firms may be
concerned with company survival rather than profit. Growing
firms, on the other hand, may be more concerned with profit
and return on investment than rapidly growing or mature
firms. Finally, organizations with technically competent or
"state-of-the-art" contracts may see obtaining a dominant
market position as more important than profit.
As Professors Greer and Liao pointed out in their
paper "Contractor Hungriness and the Relative Profitability
of DOD Business," it is well known that when the economy
weakens, resulting in a growth of excess manufacturing
capacity, real prices tend to decline with weakened profit
margins £Eef . 76 ]. As a result, when demand falls, firms
tend to engage in vigorous price competition. The amount of
profit reduction contractors are willing to accept should
therefore be inversely related to the decline in capacity
utilization. Because the Government is a powerful buyer,
contracting officers should be able to take advantage of
situations where excess capacity exists to drive "hard
bargains" and buy products at lower profit margins. On the
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other hand, when the economy is strong and there is suffi-
cient commercial and Government business to utilize full
capacity, the Government must he willing to pay the contrac-
tors a profit rate which at least reaches parity with the
commercial sector. Otherwise, industry would have no incen-
tive to accept Government contracts.
Dr. Richard F. DeHong and Dr. Daniel E. Strayer
propose that firms are primarily profit oriented only under
economic conditions of pure competition and then only when
there is owner control of the firm [Ref. 77]. They are
proponents of other motivating forces such as sales, produc-
tion, or firm perpetuation overshadowing maximum profits as
a motivating force.
DeMong and Strayer contend that the drive to
maximize profits is diluted by the separation of owner and
manager. The goals of the decision making managers may be
quite different from the goals of the owners. While the
owners may indeed be more concerned with maximizing their
return on investment, profit maximization has been replaced
among the managers by "profit satisf icing, " or the desire to
obtain satisfactory profits. Managers are held accountable
for more than just profits; they are also held responsible
for company production, sales, firm perpetuation, employee
morale, etc. Because managers cannot devote their full time
to profit maximization, to the exclusion of all other goals.
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they are forced to ensure profits reach an acceptably satis-
factory level, then concentrate on the other competing goals
£Ref. 78]-
Phillip E. Cppedahl has developed a hierarchy of
needs for a corporation which parallels Maslow's hierarchy
of individual needs [Ref. 79]. Just as Maslow proposed that
individuals seek to satisfy the most basic human needs first
(physiological needs, safety and security needs, love and
belonging needs) and then seek satisfaction of higher needs
(esteem, self-actualization, the need to know and under-
stand, and esthetic needs), Oppedahl proposes that a corpo-
ration seeks to satisfy the needs of survival, profit,
growth, market share, and prestige (in that order).
Survival is the most basic need. Once the need to
be a "going concern" has been satisfied, the profit motive
becomes the primary motivator for the corporation. However,
jast as DeMong and Strayer discussed the concept of "profit
satisficing, " Oppedahl contends that profit does not always
equate to profit maximization. Rather, the concept of
"adequate profit" suffices as demonstrated by the following:
In terms of Government contracts, growth is associated
with more contracts and and larger target costs. Note
that with the profit need satisfied, greater size
contracts become the driving motive. This will tend to
explain why some firms will spend to target cost and
beyond at the expense of a share ratio loss of profit.
The other aspect of growth, namely technical capability,
is also very important to a defense contractor. Most
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DOD contracts are labor intensive and highly technical
in scope. Highly educated and qualified personnel are
very important to the growth cf a DOD contractor, there-
fore, sacrificing profit share may be attractive tc a
contractor relative to maintaining and increasing tech-
nical competence [ Ref . 80 ].
While the DOD and NASA Incentive Contracting Guid e
recognizes the ^profit motive as the "essence of incentive
contracting," it also recognizes that other extr acontract ual
factors can be significant motivators to the Defense
contractor. These factors include growth, new product
improvement, prestige, improved public image, social
approval, national defense goals, potential for follow on
business, commercial application, excess capacities,
increased profits on other contracts through shared over-
head, and excelling for the sake of excellence. In addi-
tion, DOD "recognizes that contractors will, generally,
optimize, not maximize, profit" [fief. 81].
Finally, in his book Arming America: How the U.S.
Buys Weapons, J. Ronald Fox contends that;
Profit is not a defense contractor's only concern when
bidding on or conducting a development or production
program. Defense contracts are sought to cover payroll
and overhead costs, and to provide company personnel
with the opportunity to develop technical and managerial
skills useful in commercial and defense business. Once
a contract is won, a company seeks every opportunity to
add work and funds to the program. The need for follow
on work is crucial, since (1) the initial effort to
secure a contract involves a large outlay of money, and
(2) there is usually a long time lapse between contracts
for the same weapon system [Ref. 82].
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D. CONCIOSION
So what's the answer? Is "profit as a motivational
tool" fact or fiction? The answer appears to be "a little
of both." There is no clear cut answer to the question.
While it is clear that profit is not the only motivating
force for Government contractors, there are times when
profit would certainly be the prime motivational tool, such
as periods of strong economic growth as discussed earlier.
In addition, it is the researcher's opinion that the DOD
profit policy evolved into what it is today because it is
relatively easy for contracting officers to understand; we
have been so "ingrained with the principles of profit maxim-
ization that the concept seems almost intuitively obvious."
It may be more appropriate to think of profit as a
"satisficer" rather than a "motivator." Contractors will
certainly not perform without a certain profit level.
However, once that level of profit is achieved, they may not
increase performance with additional profits alone.
It is incumbent upon the contracting officer to recog-
nize that these extracontract ual motivating forces do in
fact exist. The contracting officer must examine each
contracting situation carefully and attempt to determine
which factors (in addition to profit) will stimulate and
motivate the contractor to improve his performance. The
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proper motivational mechanism must then be incorporated into
the contract and the contract properly administered to
ensure effective results.
It must be remembered that industry's top rated objec-
tives are to provide a good product and to maintain long
term continuing business relationships. These objectives
indicate more concern with long term profit objectives than
with short term objectives. In the words of one Defense
contractor corporate officer.
They (contractor objectives) are so closely interre-
lated, it is difficult to rank one above the other or
claim to have one objective without the other one....
We're all in this business to make money..,. So to say
that profit is not a primary objective would be wrong.
But it is not the only objective.... Of course we want
to survive and grow. But without a good reputation and
adequate profits we are out of business. All four,
company survival, company growth, promoting the compa-
ny's reputation, and profit are primary objectives on
each and every Government contract. No one objective is
more important than the other [Ref. 83].
The theoretical background and framework of CPAF
contracts have been examined along with those factors and
influences which motivate a contractor. The next chapter
will report the results of an examination of various CPAF
contracts conducted in an attempt to gain insight into the
award fee determination process.
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IV. S5IDCTURING AN AHABD FEE
An evaluation of the award fee determination process in
CPAF contracts is really a two step process. The first step
involves an examination of pre-award activities and the
development and structuring cf contract elements which
influence the award fee determination process. The second
step involves contract administration functions in terms of
evaluation and fee determination procedures. This chapter
will examine the first step in this process and attempt to
answer the following questions:
1. What considerations go into determining the size of
the base fee? How large should the base fee be?
2. How should the award fee, which remains in the award
fee pool after the fee determination is made, be
handled?
3. What considerations are necessary in formulating the
evaluation criteria?
4. How long should the award fee evaluation period be?
What criteria should be used in making this
determination?
5. How should the award fee computation formulas be
developed? What considerations are necessary?
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A. ICEMOLATION OF THE BASE FEE
The FAE limits the size of the base fee to three percent
of the contract target cost. Additionally, Chapter II
pointed out that the base fee cculd, in fact, be zero. At
¥hat level should the base fee he set? Should the base fee
be zero or three percent, or should it be set somewhere
between the two limits?
The Commissi en on Government Procurement (COGP) in 1972
concluded that the "overall risks under a CPAF contract were
at least equal to the risks under a cost-plus-fixed- fee
(CPFF) contract" [Ref. 84]. It was therefore concluded that
the base fee of a CPAF contract should be at least equiva-
lent to that which would be appropriate if the contract were
CPFF, with the provision for subjective fee adjustments to
be both upward and downward. The rationale here is that the
CPAF contract was devised as an incentive type, with a
subjective fee adjustment, to te used when the anticipated
results were of such a nature that a formalized CPIF sharing
formula, for both upward and downward adjustments of fee,
could not be developed. The Commission also concluded that
"there is no particular justification for the CPAF bass fee
to be inordinately low (three percent maximum) with an award
fee upward only" [Ref. 85].
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A CPAF contract lies between the spectrum of a CPFF
contract, where the Government assumes 100 percent of the
risk, and a firm-fixed-price (FPP) contract, with the
contractor assuming 100 percent of the risk. Between these
two types of contracts, tradeoffs occur concerning the "risk
sharing ratio." As such, the risks under a CPAF contract
are not at "least equal to those under a CPFF contract". If
the risks vere equal, a CPFF contract should be used rather
than a CPAF contract.
If the logic of the Commission on Government Procurement
were followed, the base fee would be set at seven or eight
percent. It must always be remembered that one of the
primary purposes of a CPAF contract is to motivate the
contractor. The higher the base fee becomes, the more the
contract appears to approach a cost-pius-fixed-fee contract
with award fee provisions (CPFF/AF) . Additionally, the
larger the base fee becomes, the smaller the award fee pool
must be to comply with the statutory fee limitations
discussed in Chapter II. To he a sufficient motivational
tool, the award fee must be material in amount; large enough
for the contractor to be incentivized to "achieve the carrot
at the end of the stick". The smaller the award fee, the
the more likely it is that the contractor will lose his
motivation to earn the fee because, as one corporate officer
put it, "the trouble and expense is not worth the payoff."
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It would appear logical to establish the base fee at as
small a level as possible, at or below three percent. A
CPAF contract in its true form would have a zero base fee,
and maximize the award fee pool to gain the greatest motiva-
tional leverage over the contractor. Tne majority of
Government personnel interviewed indicated that the base fee
should be three percent, because it's "authorized in the
FAR," or "it appears to be the standard; three percent has
become a way of life." One Acquisition Branch Manager for a
major Navy project indicated that the size of the base fee
should "depend on the complexity of the project- It should
be flexible between 1.5 and 5 percent depending on the risk.
The average is three percent and it should be percent only
with a stable product." He continued that if the product is
truly stable, a fixed-price type of contract should be used.
The majority of the contracts examined by the researcher
contained a base fee of three percent, with only one
contract having a zero base fee.
In the researcher's opinion, contracting officers appear
to have lost sight of the basics. According to Dr. Meiners,
a noted specialist with CPAF contracts, "the base fee, when
originally conceived, was intended only to cover the
contractor's unallowable costs, which historically have been
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two percent."* In the researcher's opinion, this naturally
assumes that there is a potential for the contractor to earn
none of the fee available in the award fee pool. Dr.
Meiners also pointed out that "there is no other type of
contract where funds are set aside specifically to cover
unallowatle expenses." These expenses are normally covered
by the standard profit or fee the contractor earns.
In the researcher's opinion, the use of a base fee is,
therefore, only for those situations where the Government
and the contractor are so concerned with and anticipate that
the contractor may perform so poorly that the contractor
will earn only the base fee. This would certainly be the
exception rather than the rule.
B. ATHARL FEE POOL
How should funds which remain in the award fee pool,
after the award fee determination is made, be utilized? The
answer to this question is negotiable and should be resolved
during the formation of the contract and contract negotia-
tions. T¥o options exist to handle the unearned award fee.
The first option is to have that amount not awarded lost as
far as the contractor is concerned. The second option is
referred to as a "roll over," where a percentage of that
^Interview conducted on 26 July 1984
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award fee which was not earned by the contractor is relied
forward to subsequent periods.
The contracts examined and personnel interviewed were
equally split regardinq the roll over issue. Rouqhly half
of the contracts reviewed contained roll over provisions
ranging from fiO to 80 percent of the unearned award fee. Of
those personnel interviewed^ these who used roll over provi-
sions favored their use, while those who did not use roll
overs felt very strongly against them.
Recent guidance from the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT)
is t h at
:
Carry forward provisions for unearned award fees are
§X££§sslx prohibited (emphasis added) without prior
approval from Chief of Naval Material (CNI!1) . Any
portion of available award fee not awarded during an
evaluation period is not transferable to another period
without CNM approval. [fief. 17]
The researcher predicts that the impact of this recent
policy change will be to significantly reduce the use of
roll over provisions.
"What are the major concerns with the roll over issue?
To answer this question perhaps it may be appropriate to
examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of roll
over provisions.
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1 . Advanta ges
Some argue that a roll over provision enhances the
ability to motivate or incentivize the contractor by making
the award fee pools in subsequent periods more attractive.
One Administrative Contracting Officer (ACQ) indicated that
the goal is to "incentivize the contractor; if it takes
fifteen bites (at the apple) , sc be it."
One Business/Financial Manager indicated that a
"roll over provides a levered fee at the end of contract
performance." This works particularly well with contractors
who have multiple contracts. The roll over provision can be
used as a tool to protect one project against seme other
projects. This would be particularly true if those "other
projects" were not award fee contracts or if award fee
contracts did not have roll over provisions.
Another Business/Financial Manager indicated that,
if a rcll over provision is not used, the tendency is for
the PEB to inflate the grades given the contractor. There
may be some truth to this assumption; however, supporting
evidence could not be found. Along these same lines, the
assumption is that if a roll over provision were used, the
PEB would be more likely to give honest grades to the
contractor knowing that the "carrot and stick" effect can be
retained with the possibility to recover from the loss and
regain some of the lost award fee in subsequent periods.
7 8
Pinally, an Acquisition Branch .lanager indicated
that if the award fee pool were significantly small as to
not motivate the contractor to the degree desired, a roll
over provision would be desired. This would enhance the
award fee pool in subsequent periods in the hopes of
improving the contractor's motivation.
2 . Disadvantages
Without exception, all those personnel who did not
favor use of award fee roll over provisions did so because
they perceived the roll over to be a "gift to the
contractor" and allowed the contractor "multiple bites at
the apple". One individual even suggested that loss of the
unearned award fee was a larger incentive to the contractor.
The contractor would theoretically maximize efforts during
each evaluation period knowing that any award fee not earned
would be lost.
A second disadvantage of roll over provisions is
that they tend to create a "tow wave" effect by pushing
problems to a later date with the hope that the lost award
fee can be regained at a later date. The problem this
creates is that often the number of unresolved issues
becomes too large to manage effectively.
An examination of one contract which did not use a
roll over provision provides some additional information.
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Table 1 provides data over six evaluation periods for the
original contract. Table 2 contains the same data that
appeared in Table 1 except that it has been modified by the
researcher to include a 40 percent roll over provision. As
can be readily seen when comparing Table 1 with Table 2, the
roll over provision guickly inflates the award fee pool. If
not properly planned for, this inflation of the award fee
pool can lead to what some personnel consider "excessive"
fees. Table 3 shows the impact on the same data in table 1
using an 80 percent roll over provision. As can be seen in
Table 3, an additional $30,000 in award fees are earned over
that shown in Table 1 Some of those interviewed consider
this a needless "give away".
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TABLE 2
Examination of Award Fee With 40 Percent Roll Over
Award Fee
Pool With Earned Unearned















3 . Summar y
What then is the answer to the roll over issue? It
really boils down to a judgement call. As indicated
earlier, NAVMAT's guidance expressly prohibits the use of
roll over provisions without prior CNM approval. If the
reader is of the school of thought that the contractor
should never get another bite at the apple, then clearly
roll over provisions are never appropriate.
The researcher is of the opinion that circumstances
may exist which favor use of rcll over provisions and this
option should be considered. An 80 percent roll over, in
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TABLE 3
Examination of Avard Fee With 80 Percent Roll Over
Earned Unearned























TOTAL $774,50 1 $722,115 $52,386
the researcher's opinion, is too high, because it enhances
the idea held by many that award fees are "give away
programs". A 20 percent roll over may be too low to be
effective. Perhaps a 40 or 6C percent roll over provision
may be appropriate. A study to determine the most "cost
effective" roll over is beyond the scope of this thesis. If
a roll over is used, consideration must be given tc the
"inflationary factor" demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, some-
thing which has not received adequate consideration in the
past.
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Cne additional observation about the use of rcll
over provisions may be appropriate. If the reader is prima-
rily concerned with cost control, then controlling costs
through the use of no roll over provision is not the most
logical approach. Table 2 shows that the additional award
fee earned with the use of a 40 percent roll over provision
was $14,473 ($707,040 minus $692,567), which is less than
two percent of the original award fee pool. It would seem
to be more logical to focus cost control efforts at direct
labor hours and other areas where the large dollar expendi-
tures occur.
Of those contractor representatives interviewed, all
were in favor of roll over provisions, which should not be a
surprise.
C. EVALUATION CEITEEIA
Chapter II identified th€ evaluation criteria most
commonly used as the adjective-type standard rating system
which indexes a performance quality adjective and corre-
sponding explanation to a percentage of the potential award
fee available during the evaluation period. Is this really
the best way to structure the performance ratings? What
considerations should be used in developing the evaluation
criteria? These and other issues will be addressed in this
section.
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1 • Performance Eating
There are many rating plans being used today. No
two systems will be, nor should they he, identical. The
system selected must be tailored to the individual, unigue
requirements and be that' system which best fits the needs.
However, structuring of the rating plan can lead to confu-
sion for both the contractor and Government personnel.
Consider the following examples, all extracted from
different contracts and all representing the highest
performance rating in the contract:
1. Superior Performance: Eepresents 80 to 100 percent
of the potential award fee. The contractor has
demonstrated an overall level of performance which
exceeds the contract rec^uirements.
2. Superior Performance: Eepresents 86 to 100 percent
of the potential award fee. The contractor has
demonstrated an overall level of performance which
substantially exceeds the contract requirements.
3. Superior Performance: Eepresents 86 to 100 percent
of the potential award fee. The contractor has
demonstrated an overall level of performance which
greatly exceeds the contract requirements.
4. Excellent: Represents 91 to 100 percent of the
potential award fee. The contractor's performance
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greatly exceeds the merely satisfactory level of
efforts. The evaluator cannot cite relevant areas
for improvement.
5. Excellent: Represents 91 to 100 percent of the
potential award fee. The contractor's performance
exceeds requirements by a substantial margin. The
evaluator cannot cite relevant areas for improvement.
6. Excellent: Represents 86 to 100 percent of the
potential award fee. The contractor's performance
greatly exceeds the merely satisfactory level of
performance. The evaluator cannot cite relevant
areas for improvement.
7. Outstanding: Represents 36 to 100 percent of the
potential award fee. The contractor's performance
exceeds the minimum by a substantial margin,; and the
monitor can cite some area for improvement, most of
which are minor.
The first three examples above came from the same
project office, but were in contracts awarded to three
different contractors. This led to some confusion within
the project office. Was "superior" performance really 80
percent, or was it 86 percent? In addition, what's the
difference between "exceeds", "substantially exceeds", and
"greatly exceeds"? Furthermore, what's the difference
between "superior performance", "excellent", and
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"outstanding"? What does it nean to "exceed the mininium
requirements by a substantial margin"? If a contractor has
"some areas of improvement", is his performance truely
"outstanding"?
Even the recommended evaluation standards system
recommended by NASA (discussed in Chapter II) raises some
questions and creates confusion. Consider the following:
Excellent: Represents 91 to 100 percent of the poten-
tial award fee. Performance is outstanding in most
respects, approaching the best that could be performed
by a qualified contractor. Contractor has greatly
exceeded quality, schedule, output and overall
performance which would be expected of an average
contractor. Areas of deficiency are very few and
relatively unimportant in nature. Contractor shows
initiative in executing the job and invoking
improvements.
In the above example, the adjective rating is "excellent",
yet the description reads "performance is outsta ndin g in
most respects." Do "excellent" and "outstanding" mean the
same thing?
The problem appears to be one of symantics. What
may be "excellent" to one individual may not mean the same
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to another. In addition, the adjective ratings are rela-
tive; there do not exist any standards with which to rate or
compare one "excellent" rating with another.
Still another area for confusion is the number of
rating categories. Consider the following examples:
1. Contract Number 1
a) Superior Performance: 80 to 100 percent.
b) Satisfactory Performance: 50 to 80 percent.
c) Marginal Performance: 20 to 50 percent.
d) Unsatisfactory Perfor nance : percent.
2- Contract Number 2
a) Excellent: 91 to 100 percent.
b) Good: 66 to 90 percent.
c) Satisfactory: 41 to 65 percent.
d) Marginal: 21 to UO percent.
e) Unsatisfactory: 20 percent and Below.
3. Contract Number 3
a) Outstanding: 86 to 100 percent.
b) Excellent: 75 to 85 percent.
c) Good: 65 to 74 percent.
d) Acceptable: 50 to 64 percent.
e) Marginal: 30 to 49 percent.
f) minimal: to 29 percent.
In Contract Number 1 of the above examples, is an 80 percent
score "satisfactory" or "superior"? Are 51 and 79 percent
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scores in Contract Number 1 fccth "satisfactory? As the
number of rating categories are increased from four in
Contract Number 1 to six in Contract Number 3, this confu-
sion is reduced. The greater the number of rating
categories and the more specific each category is, the less
confusion there is likely to be.
If it is necessary to use a combination of adjective
and numeric ratings, the researcher suggests that the
percentages assigned to each category are flexible and may
be adjusted. In addition, each category may be further
broken down into "plus" and "minus" ratings. For example,
the "Good" category in Contract Number 3 above may be subdi-
vided as follows:
Good Plus: 72 to 74 percent.
Good: 68 to 70 percent.
Good Minus: 65 to 67 percent.
The particular structure chosen is strictly up to the
creativity of the Contracting Officer.
The performance rating exists only for the benefit
of the contractor. The ratings give the contractor some-
thing with which to relate the numerical grades. In the
researcher's opinion, this can be accomplished with the
criteria description just as well as with an adjective
rating. By eliminating the adjective rating and relying
strictly on the numerical rating, some of the confusion can
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te reduced and the contractor can decide whether an 89% is
"excellent" or "outstanding".
It is possible to improve on the rating plans
currently being used by eliminating the adjective descrip-
tions and increasing the number of rating categories. Such
an example would be as follows: [Ref. 87]
1. Represents 91 to 100 percent of the potential award
fee. The contractor's performance exceeds require-
ments by a substantial margin. The evaluator cannot
cite relevant areas for improvement.
2. Represents 83 to 90 percent of the potential award
fee. The contractor exceeds in overall performance
requirements. The evaluator may cite one or more
areas for impirovement but they are relatively minor
in terms of potential program impact and they are
substantially offset by better performance in other
areas,
3. Represents 75 to 82 percent of the potential award
fee. The contractor's performance meets all require-
ments. The performance is neither significantly
superior nor significantly inferior. Areas of risk
are of no greater degree than would ordinarily be
expected in the performance of a typical contract of
this size and complexity.
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4. Represents 67 to 74 percent of the potential award
fee. The contractor's performance is adequate
although the evaluator may cite several areas for
improvement, these are offset by better performance
in other areas being evaluated and deficiencies are
of a minor nature. This level of achievement would
be the norm for contractors completing jobs and the
contract on schedule with reasonable quality and
cost.
5. Represents 50 to 66 percent of the potential award
fee. The contractor's performance fails to meet all
requirements. There are areas of good or better
performance but these are offset by lower rated
performance in other areas.
6. Represents 31 to 49 percent of the potential award
fee. The content and quality of the contractor's
performance are close to being adequate, although
there are many areas for improvement. No major defi-
ciencies are cited.
7. Represents to 30 percent of the potential award
fee. The content and quality of contractor perform-
ance in at least one area are deemed by the evaluator
to need substantial improvement. Contractor perform-
ance in the area being evaluated is considered to be
such that a potentially adverse impact is foreseen.
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The need for improvement is such that Government
action may be required.
It should be noted that as the number of categories is
increased, the number of borderline comparisons also
increase. If the number of categories is too large, it then
becomes a problem of being able to differentiate between 74
or 75 percent adequately.
2 . Performance Evaluation Criteria
Structuring the perfomance evaluation criteria is
the heart of the award fee process. Criteria must be selec-
tively identified which, when iiiplemented, will truely moti-
vate the contractor. A number of the interviewees felt
strongly that the development of standardized evaluation
criteria should not be recommended. The Program Manager and
Contracting Officer must maintain flexibility to again
structure the criteria to the individual situation.
Standardized evaluation criteria would reduce the Program
Manager's flexibility to manage.
Those individuals who draft the evaluation criteria
must tailor the criteria to the individual contract. As one
Business/Financial Manager indicated, the first step in this
process is to gain an understanding of the environment
unique to the individual contractor. This may likely
require a visit to the contractor's plant and interviews
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with key individuals. There are some things which the
contractor may be highly motivated to perform without the
Government having to incentivize the contractor. As
discussed in Chapter III, seme of these considerations
include "extracontr actual motivators" such as company
growth, an increased share of the industry market, a better
public image, carry-over benefits to commercial business,
greater opportunity for follow on business, and greater
shareholder expectations for future growth and profit. In
addition, the Government does net want to apply motivational
forces to a contractor for those things which the contractor
already does well. The Government must consider the
contractor's individual strengths and weaknesses and only
incentivize the weaknesses. However, the Government should
be ready to incentivize areas which might now be strengths
tut tecome weaknesses at a later date.
A second concern is the number of evaluation
criteria to be used. One Program Manager indicated that if
"you incentivize everything, you end up incentivizing
nothing." The contractor cannot be overburdened with so
many different criteria upon which to focus management
talent that the contractor becomes demotivated. As several
interviewees indicated, there are generally three major






A fourth category of "Management Performance" is often iden-
tified as a separate category cr is combined with Technical
Performance. Still a fifth category periodically used is
"Design to Cost". The consensus of opinion from those
interviewed is that the number cf categories used for evalu-
ation criteria should be limited to three or four at the
maximum. The researcher believes that too many elements
will dilute the motivational effect of the award fee
concept, while too few elements will fail to adequately
measure total contractor perf or lance.
The perceived problems from interviewees with evalu-
ation criteria currently being used are that they are not
weighted properly nor are they well quantified. Evaluation
criteria which are not well quantified leave too much room
for interpretation, and some individuals feel it leaves too
much room for subjectivity. lor example, the evaluation
criteria in one multi-million dollar contract examined are
as follows:
1. Technical Performance: The contractor shall be eval-
uated as a System Prime Contractor (SPC) under this
contract based on achievement and conformance to the
specification. This shall include the evaluation of
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the contractor's perf ormaiice of all design, fabrica-
tion, reliability and maintainability, software,
integrated logistics supfort, system interface tests,
system integration, services, and system demonstra-
tions. The assessment cf SPC performance will also
be evaluated against lower indentured specifications
and the contractor's achievement of technical objec-
tives cited in management plans.
2. Management:
a) The award payments for this area shall be based on
the contractor's achievements in Management.
b) The criteria to be utilized in determining manage-
ment performance will include the effectiveness of
the contractor's management, working in associa-
tion with the Navy, to achieve an operational
system. This includes the management of inter-
faces with various Navy activities and Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) suppliers. The specific
areas to be reviewed include the following:
1. Management of GFE;
2. Relationships with associate contractors;
3. Configuration management;
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4. Effectiveness of forecasting potential prob-
lems and a suggested resolution to minimize
program impact; and
5. Compliance with Interface Control Documents
(ICD) .
3. Schedule:
a) The award payments for this area shall be based on
the contractor's achievements in providing the
necessary management controls and assets to accom-
plish the delivery of data, hardware, software,
training, maintenance, support items and the
assistance to the Navy in in maintaining total
program schedules.
b) The award fee evaluation relative to delivery
shall consist of a review of the following
criteria:
1. Delivery of all contract data requirements in
accordance with the contract Data Reguir ements
List.
2. Achievement of scheduled design, fabrication,
tests, system integration, and demonstration mile-
stones (within the projected program schedule).
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3. Recognition of fotential delivery problems,
recommendations as tc resolution and successful
attainment of agreed upon methods of resolution to
minimize program impact.
4. Cost: The award payment for the area shall be based
on the contractor's ability to manage the costs on
the Full Scale Development Program including cost
reports and the ability to implement cost avoidance
measures.
5. Design to Cost; The award payments under this area
shall be based upon the contractor's achievement of
the objectives of the Design to Cost Plan.
Much of the criticism concerning CPAF contracts
today stems from the belief by many that the determination
of multi-million dollar award fees is too subjective. The
evaluation criteria when not well-defined, as in the example
above, highlights just how subjective this determination can
be. This criticism can be reduced by better defining the
evaluation criteria and lending a degree of objectivity to
the evaluation, or at least becoming less subjective. An
example of better defined evaluation criteria will be given
at the end of this section.
The Government has the ability in the contract to
shift evaluation criteria weights from one period to the
next. It is the general feeling among those interviewed
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that this flexibility is not being utilized to the maximum
.extent possible by those using 3PAF contracts. In the
Concept Exploration j^hase of a system's development, tech-
nical performance may be the most important evaluation
element and should be weighted high, perhaps 50 percent.
Schedule performance and cost control may be less important
and management performance may be so unimportant as to be
weighted at percent. However, as the product moves into
production, management performance becomes more important as
the transition is made from development to production. It
must be remembered to change the weightings to reflect the
changing conditions. The problem with shifting the evalua-
tion criteria weights are first to determine how the weights
are to be shifted, and secondly, to make the decision and
inform the contractor in a timely manner to allow the
contractor time to respond and make the necessary adjust-
ments within the organization prior to the start of the
evaluation period. This is often difficult to accomplish
and as one Business/Financial Manager pointed out, this
flexibility is often not utilized by the Program Office.
As one senior manager who formulates policy indi-
cated, cost control is always of major concern. Some of the
criticism of CPAF contracts in recent months has arisen from
the concern that cost control has not received enough atten-
tion and weight in the evaluation criteria. The suggestion
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was made by the researcher that guidance be promulgated
"highly recommending" that cost control be given consider-
able weight relative to the other evaluation criteria.
Without exception, all those interviewed strongly felt that
this was not proper. The Program Manager must be able to
remain flexible in order to tailor the criteria to the situ-
ation. However, the consensus was that cost control should
always be an evaluation element. NAVMAT also requires that
cost control always be included as one of the evaluation
criteria [Ref- 17].
If it is not desired to standardize the weight given
to cost control, perhaps it may be appropriate to identify
evaluation criteria which should be recommended for use. It
is interesting to note that guidance does not exist which
even identifies the evaluation criteria which must be used
for cost control. This flexibility also rests with those
who tailor the criteria to the uniaue situation.
Another idea was suggested that a mathematical model
be developed which would identify the weighting to be
applied to cost control. The development of such a model is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some thoughts on
the subject are appropriate. There is some value to giving
cost more weight (i.e., 30 to UC percent) because it demon-
strates to the contractor that costs are of interest. In
the researcher's opinion, the danger lies in that the
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contractor may then decrease management attention on tech-
nical performance or the schedule effort. As Dr. Meiners
pointed out "cost is a function of cost." Cost would not be
an independent variable in any mathematical model. Cost is
dependent on both schedule and technical requirements.
Costs may be better controlled by placing more emphasis on
schedule. As the schedule imprcves, lower costs will gener-
ally result from reduced direct labor hours and overhead
charges. Work generally appears to expand by the amount of
funds the Government has. The longer the contract is in
place, the higher the costs tend to be.s
While the FAB is specific in requiring the inclusion
of the evaluation criteria in the contract, it does not
indicate that it is mandatory that these criteria be negoti-
ated with the contractor. The researcher can see advantages
to not negotiating the evaluation criteria. However, if the
contractor's fee is dependent upon how well the evaluation
criteria is written and understood, it is evident that the
contractor would have a vested interest in the development
of the criteria. As such, the contractor should, as a
minimum, be authorized to provide some input into the devel-
opment of the evaluation criteria.
^Interview conducted with Dr. Arthur C. Meiners, Jr., on
26 July 1984.
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It was the consensus from . those interviewed that
there is no cookbook solution to the formulation of evalua-
tion criteria. Each set of criteria must be individually
tailored to the unique situation. However, it is appro-
priate to examine major considerations to use when
formulating well-defined evaluation criteria. These consid-
erations are provided in Appendix D for review. Appendix D
identifies three evaluation criteria which are reccmmended
for use by the researcher. These criteria are technical/
management performance, schedule performance, and cost
performance. In addition to these criteria, major areas of
consideration are identified for each of the three criteria,
which could be modified for any of the eighteen contracts
reviewed. The more detailed the evaluation criteria, the
easier it becomes to be somewhat objective in a process
which is inherently subjective. The less subjectivity
involved with the award fee determination process, the less
there will be criticism. This subjectivity can be reduced,
in the researcher's opinion, ty increasing the number and
detail of elements when evaluating performance in each
criteria.
If a fourth evaluation element is to be used, it
should be logistics supportability , recognizing integrated
logistics support equal in importance to cost, schedule, and
technical performance. Although previously not used to
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evaluate contractor iperformance , locfistics supportability is
receiving increased attention ard visibility. Where appro-
priate, major considerations in structuring evaluation
criteria for logistics supportatility include: [Ref. 88]
1. Maintenance Planning: The contractor should partici-
pate in the process to evolve and establish mainte-
nance concepts and requirements for the lifetime of a
material system, and this participation should be
evaluated.
2. Supply Support: All management actions, procedures,
and techniques used to determine requirements to
acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer, issue,
and dispose of secondary items should be evaluated.
This includes provisioning for initial support as
well as replenishment supply support,
3. Support Equipment: The contractor should participate
and be evaluated in the identification and acquisi-
tion of all equipment (mobile or fixed) required to
support the operation and maintenance of the material
system. This includes associated multiuse end items,
ground handling and maintenance equipment, tools,
calibration equipment, test equipment, and automatic
test equipment.
4. Technical Data: The contractor should be evaluated
on the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of
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technical data provided to support the system. This
includes recorded infornation regardless of form or
character (such as manuals and drawings) of a scien-
tific or technical nature. Computer programs and
related software are not technical data; however,
documentation of computer programs and related soft-
ware are. Also excluded is financial data and other
information related to contract administration.
5. Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation: The
contractor should be evaluated on the resources,
processes, procedures, design considerations, and
methods utilized to ensure that all system equipment,
and support items are preserved, packaged, handled,
and transported properly, including environmental
considerations, eguipmert preservation requirements
for short and long term storage, and
transportability.
6. Design Interface: The relationship of logistics
related design parameters, such as reliability and
maintainability, readiness, availability, and support
resource requirements should be evaluated. These
logistics-related design parameters should be
expressed in operational terms rather than as
inherent values and specifically relate to system






In summary, the development of the evaluation
criteria cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. An evaluation
of the contractor's strengths and weaknesses must be
completed, with the weaknesses highlighted in the evaluation
criteria.
D. E7ALDATI0N PERIOD LENGTH
The Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) specifies that
generally, each performance evaluation period will not be
greater than three months [Ref- 89]. How long should the
award fee evaluation period be? What criteria should be
used in making this deterrainaticn? These criteria have yet
to be formalized and published as guidance.
1 . Deterninat ion Crite ria
Before it is possible tc answer the first question,
it is necessary to examine the criteria used in selecting
the length of the evaluation period. These elements, as
identified in several interviews, in no particular order of
importance, are:
1. Projected length of the contract;
2. Contract complexity;
3. Size of the contract; and
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U. Administrative reguiremeEts.
a. Projected Length of the Contract
The estimated length of contract performance is
one of the key elements in selecting length of the evalua-
tion periods. If a contract is expected to run for nine
months, such as in the overhaul of surface combatant ships,
then three month evaluation periods are almost mandated in
the researcher's opinion. This gives the Project Officer
three data points with which tc evaluate cost and perform-
ance trends, as well as provides flexibility to twice adjust
evaluation criteria weightings, if necessary, to redirect
the contractor's efforts. On the other hand, in the case of
a contract which is expected to last longer (i.e., 18 to 36
months) , it may be appropriate to extend the interval of
evaluation periods to perhaps four, six, or nine months.
fc. Contract Complexity
As one Business/Financial Manager indicated, in
a complex contract with many events and key milestones
occurring quickly, the longer the wait between evaluation
periods, the increased probability that critical problem
areas will not be highlighted and brought to management's
attention in a timely manner. If there are delays or
significant problems which go undetected, this will result
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in a bow wave effect and impact subsequent events in future
periods.
As another Business/Financial Manager indicated,
another consideration is that events which happened more
recently and are fresh in the minds of performance evalua-
tors will tend to bias the evaluation. This appears to be
true for all evaluation periods of considerable duration
(i.e., six months or more), but is particularly evident with
more complex programs. This problem may be reduced by
shortening the length of the evaluation period to three or
four months. The researcher suggests that a creative CPAF
contract may have variable length evaluation periods if the
amount of work to be done in some periods is less than in
others. Such a situation may occur in a research and devel-
opment contract when the initial effort is small compared to
other periods.
c. Size of the Contract
The general rule of thumb appears to be, from
those interviewed, that the larger the size of the contract,
in terms of target cost and award fee pool dollars, the
shorter the evaluation period should be. This thought stems
from the fact that the Prograir Managers are custodians of
public funds and the belief by many that CPAF contracts are
really "give away" programs. The more frequently the PEB
105
meets and the FDO provides feedback to the contractor, the
tetter "upper management" and the "watchdogs" feel about the
job being i^erformed because it appears that the Program
Manager is maintaining tight cortrol over the project.
d. Administrative Requirements
Most interviewees fcr this study were in agree-
ment that CPAF contracts are th€ most difficult contracts to
administer because of the increased administrative burden in
terms of manhours required to monitor performance, gather
the PEB together for deliberations, and to publish the PDO
findings. One individual even went as far as to say that
"award fees double the complexity of administering
contracts.
"
The award fee provisions force Government repre-
sentatives and managers to pay closer attention to the
contractor and understand both the contractor's actions as
well as the contractor's strengths and weaknesses. There is
not much room for doubt on the part of Government represen-
tatives. Government managers must be sure of their posi-
tions, more so than with any other type of contract. As one
Cost Analyst indicated, unique features of CPAF contracts
require that Government personnel spend more time ic admin-
istering CPAF contracts.
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The time spent in monitoring performance cannot
te reduced. However, the time spent in preparing testimony
for the PEB, the PEB deliberations, and administrative
requirements of the FDO can he reduced by extending the
evaluation periods.
Still another problem of short (i.e., three
months) evaluation periods is timely feedback to the
contractor early enough to modify the contractor's perform-
ance in subsequent periods. NAYMAT's guidance is that the
Award Fee Board (PEB) shall meet as "reasonably close to the
end of an award fee period as possible" [Hef. 90 J. In
reality, this means two to three weeks (10 to 15 working
days) after the end of the evaluation period. The following
sequence of events was extracted from one contract reviewed,
and is typical of most contracts:
1. Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of testi-
mony and input to the PEB, the Board shall prepare
the performance evaluation and present it to the FDO.
2. Within five (5) days from receipt of that evaluation,
the FDO shall submit to the Contracting Officer his
determination of award fee.
3. Within five (5) days from receipt of that determina-
tion, the Contracting Officer shall notify the
contractor in writing of the EDO's determination.
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4. Within five (5) days frcm receipt of the Contracting
Officer's notification, the contractor may submit to
the Contracting Officer any exception with respect
thereto. In support of his reclama, the contractor
may furnish a written description of his performance
during the period under consideration. This descrip-
tion shall clearly identify specific evaluation
categories, factors, elements, and the contractor's
own rating thereof.
5- Within five (5) days from receipt of the contractor's
reclama, the Contracting Officer shall submit it to
the FDO.
6. Within ten (10) days frcm receipt thereof, the FDO
shall provide to the Contracting Officer a final
performance eval uatio n (underline provided by
researcher) and determination of the award fee.
7. Within five (5) days from receipt of the final deter-
mination, the Contracting Officer shall notify the
contractor in writing of that final determination.
8. Within five (5) days frcm the date of this notifica-
tion, the Contracting Officer shall issue a unilat-
eral modification to the contract to provide for the
award fee.
If the above sequence of events were followed,
the contractor would not receive formal written notification
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of the FDO's final performance evaluation until 50 days
following the deliberations of the PE3. This is clearly too
late to modify the contractor's performance in a three month
(90 day) evaluation period; With over 50 percent of the
subsequent period past, the contractor would not be given an
opportunity to modify performance in response to the last
performance evaluation and any shifting of weights for the
evaluation criteria. It can be argued that the contractor
knows well in advance of the FDC's final performance evalua-
tion where improvements are needed through informal lines of
communications. However, if the FDD's final evaluation does
not agree with the informal communication, then needless
energy and resources have been expended and the contractor
may in fact become deiotivated
.
Even if the contractor is informed of the FDO's
determinations at the conclusion of the PEB deliberations,
15 to 20 percent of the next evaluation period could have
expired if the PEB deliberations were lengthy or the PEB met
in the third week of the new period.
In the researcher's opinion, one solution to
this problem appears to be to have the PEB meet during the
last ten working days of the evaluation period and encourage
the FDO to be a member of the PEB. The FDO should then be
in a position, after hearing all the testimony, to provide
the contractor with a "prelimi cary" determination in terms
109
of what areas the ccntractor should focus his attention on
in the following period. Some FDOs may be reluctant to
provide a "preliminary" determination. However, if the
contractor accepts the preliminary determination as just
that, and recognizes that it is not binding on the FDO, this
reluctance should not be a problem for the FDO.
2 . Determining the Evaluation Period Length
What then is the answer to the guestion "how long
should the award fee evaluation period be"? There is no
cookbook solution. The Program Manager must retain flexi-
bility in this determination and reach a decision after
evaluating all the "pros" and "cons". The majority of
opinion from those interviewed favor the three month, or
quarterly, evaluation period. One Business/Financial
Manager referred to as the "QPR effect" (or Quarterly
Performance Review)
:
Things happen just prior to the QPE.... Correspondence
is responded to,... Performance improves-... Physical
actions take place.... Modules get moved.... Problems
get resolved.-.. The QPR effect results in action.
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E. FEE COMPUTATION POEaOLAS
How should the award fee be computed? Three different
methods were utilized in the various contracts reviewed and
will he discussed in this section.
The first method is similar to that which is recommended
in the FAR (see Appendix C for review) . This method calls
for each evaluation category to be multiplied by the appro-
priate rating percentage. This earned percentage for each
category is then totaled. This factor is again multiplied
by the amount available in the award fee pool to determine
the earned award fee amount for that evaluation period. In
the researcher's opinion, the one weakness in this method is
that the contractor is rewarded for unsatisfactory perform-
ance through the award of some amount of fee, although the
award fee may be small in amount.
The second method observed in one Program Office is
quite complicated and involves numerous mathematical deriva-
tions. Prior to discussing the formala for the award fee
determination, some definitions and supporting formulas must
be clarified:
1 . The Quarterly Award Fee Tool (QAFP) consists of the
summation of a Primary Award Fee Pool (PAFP) and a
Reallocated Award Fee Pool (RAFP)
.
111
2. The PAF? available during any evaluation period shall
be derived by determining the progress made by the
contractor during the evaluation period. The prog-
ress shall be determined by dividing the cumulative
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) & to date by
the total Budgeted Cost at Completion (BCC) ^
including Reserves, as they appear on the Cost
Performance Report (CPR) . This percentage will then
be applied to the contract Total Award Fee Pool
(TAFP) . The TAFP is defined as the sum of the base
fee and award fee. From this total will be
subtracted the sum of the PAFP pools that were avail-
able through the previous evaluation period to deter-
mine the PAFP available for the period being
evaluated.
3. RAFP: Of the unawarded CAFP during any period, forty
percent will be reallocated to the remaining portion
of the contract. Each quarter a portion of this
^Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) is defined as
the budget applicable to the work actually accomplished.
BCWP is determined by adding uf the budgets of those work
packages which have been completed along with an estimated
amount of budget for the completed work in open work
packages.
"'Budgeted Cost at Completion (BCC) can be defined as the
budget applicable to the work scheduled to be accomplished
within a given time frame. BCC is determined by adding up
the budgets applicable to work packages scheduled to be
accomplished.
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amount less the sum of all RAFPs from previous cjuar-
ters will be allocated based on the progress made
during the quarter compared to work remaining in the
contract.
I^^hen the QAFP and PAFP have been computed, the award fee
to be paid to the contractor for any period can be computed
by multiplying the QAFP by a factor (Fn) and subtracting
0.20 of the PAFP. The Fn is set by the FDO based on the
evaluation of the contractor's performance by the PEB. In
no case will the award fee be less than zero.
The above example of award fee determination was
extracted from a contract with a three percent base fee and
a forty percent roll ever provision for unearned award fee.
The subtraction of 0-20 of the PAFP in the above paragraph
was meant to offset the effects of the base fee. The same
effect could have been achieved by reducing the size of the
base fee to something between zero and one percent. In the
researcher's opinion, the weakness in the above approach is
that it is cumbersome and time consuming; all the records
and formula computations were maintained by hand on a single
data sheet. In addition, the process could also be
confusing to both the contractor and Government representa-
tives, raising questions in some individual's minds.
The third, and most popular, method observed for deter-
mining the amount of award fee used a basic formula which
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the researcher has modified into a generic mathematical
formula. This formula can be expressed as:
(Rating - A) / B x 100 = Award Fee Percentage (4.1)
In equation 4- 1 the "A" repre£ents that maximum threshold
which is considered to be unsatisfactory performance;
whether it be 20, 30, or 40 percent. The "B" is simply 100
minus "A" so that if "A" were 2 percent, "B" would equal 80
percent.
It is easy to understand why this last method is the
most popular. It is relatively easy to understand, leaves
little room for confusion, and does not award the contractor
for unsatisfactory performance. If a performance rating of
30 percent or below were deemed unsatisfactory, the
contractor would simply not be entitled to any award fee for
a rating of 30 percent or below.
F. CCNCIDSION
This chapter examined pre-award activities and the
development and structuring cf contract elements which
influence the award fee determiration process. In examining
the determination of the base fee, it was discovered that
when originally conceived, the base fee was intended only to
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cover the contractor's unallowatle costs. Unallowable costs
are normally covered by the standard profit or fee the
contractor earns. Therefore, any base fee which is above
zero should be the exception rather than the rule and should
be used only for those situations where the Government and
the contractor are so concerned with, and anticipate that
the contractor may perform so poorly that the contractor
will earn only the base fee.
Funds which remain in the award fee pool, after the
award fee determination is made, can be handled in one of
two ways. These funds can either be "lost" as far as the
contractor is concerned, or a percentage of that award fee
which was not earned by the contractor can be rolled forward
to subsequent periods. Advantages and disadvantages of each
option were examined.
The development of the evaluation criteria cannot be
accomplished in a vacuum. An evaluation of the contractor's
strengths and weaknesses must be completed, with the weak-
nesses highlighted in the evaluation criteria. The four
criteria recommended by the researcher were technical/
management performance, schedule performance, cost perform-
ance, and logistics supportability. Major considerations in
developing the evaluation criteria were also reviewed and
examined.
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In discussing the length of the evaluation period, four
elements where identified which must be examined prior to
determining how long the evaluation period should be. These
four elements are projected length of the contract, contract
complexity, size of the contract, and administrative
requirements. The majority of those interviewed favor the
three month, or quarterly, evaluation period.
Finally^ three methods were identified with which the
award fee could be computed. The third method, represented
in equation 4.1, is recommended by the researcher.
The next chapter examines those functions involved with
administering CPAF contracts and activities which impact on
the award fee determination process. The chapter will
conclude with a section dedicated to data/trend analysis of
award fees in those CPAF contracts reviewed.
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7. ISSUES IN ADMINISTERING COST-PLOS-AWABDzFEE CONTRACTS
1. INTRODDCTIOH
Now that the pre-award contract award fee considerations
have been reviewed, it is appropriate to discuss those post-
award (or contract adiinistraticn) functions and activities
which impact on the award fee determination process. These
functions include the Performance Evaluation Board composi-
tion and proceedings and the authority of the Fee
Determination Official. The chapter will conclude with a
section dedicated to data/trend analysis of award fees in
those CPAF contracts reviewed.
B. PERFORflANCE EVALUATION BOARE COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS
It is first appropriate to discuss the Performance
Evaluation Board's (PEB) composition prior to discussing the
proceedings of the hoard. Who sits in on the board's
proceedings? Who should be represented on the board? These
and other questions will be addressed in the next few
paragraphs.
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1 . Com£osi tion
Naval Material Command guidance on the composition
of the PIB is clear £Bef. 91]-
Award fee contracts shall include a provision for an
Award Fee Board (AFB) whose primary function will be to
recommend to the IDO an award fee for each award fee
performance period. The recommendation will be stated
in terms of a percentage to be applied to the award pool
for the period being evaluated. Members of the AFB
shall be designated by functional job title and shall
include representatives of various disciplines having
significant association with the work being performed^
i.e.. Engineering, Quality Assurance, Finance,
Production, Contracting, Test and Trials, etc. Dp to
25% of the AFB may be comprised of personnel who are not
associated with the contract effort involved. The FDO
may be a member of the board, in which instance the FDO
will be the chairperson.
It is interesting to note that while the NAVHAT
guidance authorizes up to 25 percent of the PEB to be
composed of personnel who are not associated with the
contract effort, it does not require the PEB to have
Government representation from the contractor's on-site
office. In one contract reviewed, the PEB was composed of:
1. The Contracting Officer or his appointed Government
representative;
2. Six technical representatives from the Naval Air
Systems Command;
3. Three representatives of the Program Office;
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4. Two technical representatives of the Naval Sea
Systems Command; and
5. One representative of the Naval Electronics Systems
Ccmmand.
The researcher finds it difficult to understand how the fDO
can receive a fair and eguitatle evaluation from the PE3
without having on-site representation! With the exception
of one of the eighteen contracts reviewed, all the other
contracts had on-site representation on the PEB, and all
personnel interviewed, with the one exception, agreed that
PEB on-site representation is critical to the success of the
program. A representative of the one contract which did not
have on-site representation cited "Program Manager's judge-
ment" as the reason for the lack of well-balanced represen-
tation. As one Eusiness/Pinanciai Manager indicated,
"on-site representation reduces needless criticism and prob-
lems for the PEB." While nearly everyone agreed that
on-site representation was necessary, it was not clear as to
the positions and backgrounds these representatives should
have. Seme advocated that it was only necessary to have the
head of the on-site office as a member of the PEB; while
others advocated more balanced representation in terms of
specialty areas (Quality Control, Production, Finance,
etc- ) .
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Generally, all members cf the PE3 are professionally
competent senior Government managers. One contract went so
far as to specify the composition of the PES by subdividing
the board into voting and non-voting members. The seven
voting members consisted cf the Program Manager,
Administrative Contracting Officer, a customer representa-
tive and members from both the Systems Command and on-site
office. Non-voting members *ere to be assigned by the
Chairperson (Program Manager) of the PEB to assist in the
proceedings and could consist of:
1. An evaluation coordinator who handles all administra-
tive actions for the PEB meeting to include: setting
up the meeting, assembling category representative
reports and other pertinent information for hoard
members, serving as the point of contact with the
contractor and preparing a draft performance evalua-
tion letter to the FDO for the PEB.
2. The recorder who prepares minutes of the PEB
meetings.
3. Category representatives who analyze monitor reports
and present findings to the PEB.
U. Legal counsel (if desired by the Chairperson)
.
The researcher can see advantages (and no real disadvan-
tages) to including ncn-voting members on the PEB. It would
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certainly expedite the proceediDgs and provide clarification
where needed without having to adjourn the meeting.
2 • Proceedings
Naval Material Command guidance on the PEB proceed-
ings are somewhat general [Eef- 923«
(1) The PEB shall meet as reasonably close to the end of
an award fee period as possihle- Timely determination
of award fees is one of the upmost importance in making
the award process work. The board shall receive
reports, both oral and written, as considered necessary,
from all interested parties. A report will be presented
by the contractor. The PEE is encourage d (emphasis
added) to invite contractors to be present during the
presentation of these reports.
(2) At the conclusion of the PEB meeting, the board
shall, in closed session, derive a final overall score
by category, i.e., technical, management, cost, etc.,
and report its recommendation including formal written
rationale for the score to the EDO.
Most PEB proceedings reviewed followed basically the
same format. A typical sequence of events for the conduct
of a PEB meeting would be as follows: [Ref. 93]
1. Pertinent information for each voting member should
be assembled. This information should include:
a) Representative and monitor reports;
b) A summary of the impact of scoring on fee determi-
nation. This should include a breakdown of data
by rating, award fee percentage, and corresponding
dollar value for the award fee.
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c) A copy of previous period PEB recommendation
letters.
d) A copy of the performance ratings and criteria.
e) A list of key milestone events for the period.
2. The contractor is normally invited to attend the
first and second segments of the PEB meeting.
Attendance is generally limited to a few key manage-
ment personnel. Documentation used by the board is
noty nor should it he, made available to the
contractor.
3. The first segment of the PEB meeting, for participa-
tion of contractor personnel, normally consists of a
presentation by the contractor, if desired, followed
by questions presented to the contractor resulting
from board members review of Government and
contractor input. All representatives' presentations
for each category the contractor wishes to address
should precede questions to the contractor. It is at
this point that the contractor's active participation
in the PEB should be completed.
4. The second segment of the PEB meeting generally
consists of a discussion led by predesignated
Government representatives as category leaders of the
pertinent points. This segment may be attended by a
top contractor management representative, usually
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above the program supervisory level, but should not
include further input by the contractor. The discus-
sion usually begins with a suniiaarization by the
category leader with a recommended score, followed by-
comments from other board members. The contractor
representative who is present during this segment
assumes a passive role.
5. The third segment of the PEB meeting generally
consists of determining performance ratings for each
score and finalizing a recommendation letter which
supports the ratings. The contractor is not to be
present during this segment. Any discussion of
performance should be to justify a recommended score,
but should not present any new information. Previous
period letters are to be reviewed so that members are
aware of previous ratings given in order to be able
to highlight improved areas or continued problem
areas in making the evaluation of performance.
6. Each category leader then summarizes the facts from
preformance ratings established during negotiations
and presents an adjective rating.
7. The scoring procedure is either by member negotiation
(majority opinion) or averaging. Neither method is
recommended over the other; however, consistency from
one period to the next should be maintained. The
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system chosen for use should be a part of the imple-
aentation plan. In accordance with a pre-established
scoring sheet, the final rating is the weighted
average of the category scores. The P EB generally
remains in session until a final letter is agreed
upon by the voting members of the board for the FDO.
One Project Manager has developed a set of unwritten
rules for the conduct of the PEB proceedings. These rules
are applicable to any PEB evaluation process and should be
observed:
1. Board members do not intimidate witnesses;
2. Board members do not reveal to one witness what
another witness said;
3. Witnesses do not discuss their testimony with anyone
else, including other witnesses;
4. Fitnesses testimony must be limited to the evaluation
period with no reference to the events outside the
period.
All PEB members interviewed indicated that, although not
formalized, there was general agreement that the above
guidelines were followed in most instances.
The above sequence of events discussed for the PEB
proceedings were common to all contracts reviewed, with one
exception. The one difference of opinion centered around
step two. Some Project Managers and Business/Financial
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Managers felt strongly about not having a contractor repre-
sentative present during presentations by the Government
witnesses. It was felt that contractor representation would
tend to intimidate the witnesses. Others indicated that
this was not a concern. The researcher does not take a
position favoring either side of the issue. On the one
hand/ intimidation of the witness may be a possibility.
However, if the witnesses are professionally competent,
senior managers within the Government's on-site office and
know that they have the support and backing of their super-
visor who expects them to be honest and present a true
picture of a contractor's performance, intimidation should
not be of concern. In addition, having the contractor
representatives present during the testimony allows senior
contractor management to receive feedback "straight from the
horse's mouth". This represents just one more opportunity
to open and strengthen the line of communication between the
Government and the contractor. The decision whether to
allow contractor representatives to be present during
Government witness testimony shculd remain with the discre-
tion and better business judgement of the Project Manager.
One concern common throughout all PEB members inter-
viewed was that the testimony from Government witnesses
during the presentations and discussions too often did not
agree with or support the grade recommended. Witnesses are
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generally mid-grade Government employees who work with the
contractor on a daily basis. One of two situations gener-
ally existed. The first is that the grades recommended were
often too low compared to the written input to the board.
For example, a recommended grade of 70 percent would be
accompanied by a description that indicates "performance is
outstanding in most respects, with a few areas of major and
minor deficiencies". The second situation encountered is
just the opposite, where a recommended high grade is
supported with a relatively weak narrative description.
The obvious solution to the problem described in the
above paragraph is a formali2ed training and education
process for those who provide testimony to the PEB.
Witnesses must realize the impact their testimony has on the
PEB's proceedings and the eventual determination of award
fees. This training should include how to write evaluations
which support the recommended grade.
C- AOTHOKITY OF THE FEE DETERMINATION OFFICIAL
An examination of the last key element in the evaluation
of the fee determination process is appropriate; that is, an




1 • Role of the Zee Det ermi Lation Official
Ihe FDO is the single most important individual in
the fee determination process. In all contracts examined,
the ILO was the Project Manager. In the arena of major
weapon systems acquisition, it is logical for the Project
Manager to assume the role ox the FDO. This function
provides the Project Manager an additional opportunity to
"stay on top of the project" and be effective as the manager
of the project. Every person interviewed indicated that an
effective Project Manager wculd want to assume this
function.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the FDO may or
may not be a member of the PEB. If the FDO is a member of
the PEB, then the FDC will assume the additional responsi-
bilities of PEB Chairperson.
2 - Authority of the Fee Determination Off ic ial
The Naval Material Ccmmand vests the following
authority in the FDO: [Ref. 9U].
The FDO shall, based on the recommendation of the PEB
and any other pertinent information known, determine
(emphasis added by the researcher) the award fee for the
period in question.
127
The final award fee determination rests with the FDO, and
only with the PDO.
The findings of the PEB are only recommendations to
the FDO. The FDO is not bound to follow the recommendations
of the PEB, and may in fact modify the amount of the award
fee based on "other pertinent information". How often does
the FDO disagree with the recommendations and input from the
PEB? In analyzing interviews conducted, the answer to this
question really depends on whether or not the FDO plays an
active role in the PEB. If the FDO is a member of the PEB,
all of the concerns nf each member, including the FDO, are
expressed prior to the determination of a grade. If the FDO
disagrees with a determination, at least the FDO sat in on
the PEB proceedings and is familiar with the logic behind
the decision. In all cases involved in this study where the
FDO was also a member of the PEB, the FDO accepted the
recommendations of the PEB and never modified the recom-
mended score.
In cases where the FDO did not sit in as a member of
th.e PEB, cases of both agreement with the PEB recommenda-
tions and disagreement were found. In one contract reviewed
where the FDO was not a member of the PEB, the FDO always
accepted the PEB's recommendations and never modified the
amount of the award fee. Those individuals associated with
this program insisted that the FDO»s findings were not a
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"rubber stamp," that the findirgs were complete and exten-
sive covering all concerns and questions of the FDO. In
this case, the PE3 Chairperson was also the Deputy Program
Manager. As indicated by the Business/Financial Manager,
the "Program Manager's concerns are also the Deputy Program
Manager's concerns. We all have to live and work together."
In those cases where the FDO did not sit in as a
member of the PEB and disagreed with the recommendations
provided, the FDO would frequently modify the amount of the
award fee. In no case observed did this modification result
in a lower award fee being awarded to the contractor, an
i
most modifications were modest (1 to 2 percent) increases.
The reasons given for these modifications were in all cases
"valid reclamas" from the contractor.
a. Potential for Abuse
It is interesting to note that the NAVMAT
guidance requires the PEB to report its "recommendation
including formal written rationale for the score to the FDO"
£fief. 17]- If the FDO does net agree with the recommenda-
tions of the PEB and modifies the award fee, no guidance
available requires the FDO to document the rationale for
this decision. In one contract examined, the PEB recom-





3. Design to Cost: Satisfactory
4. Cost Control: Marginal
5. Management: Marginal
These ratings reflect the following definitions:
1. Satisfactory Performance: Represents 56 to 75
percent of the potential award fee. The contractor
has demonstrated an overall level of performance
which meets the contract re-^uirements.
2. Marginal Performance: Represents 26 to 55 percent of
the potential award fee. The contractor has demon-
strated an overall level of performance which is
below the contract requirements.
Without "apparent" justification, the FDO (who
was also the Project Manager) modified the PEB recommended
grades to the following:
1. Technical: Satisfactory
2. Schedule: Satisfactory
3. Design to Cost: Good
4. Cost Control: Satisfactory
5. Management: Satisfactory
A "Good" grade represented 76 tc 85 percent of the potential
award fee and the contractor demonstrated an overall level
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of performance which is slightly higher than contract
requirements.
While there may be sufficient justification for
the modifications, this information was not available either
in the contract file or from those in the Program Office.
The IDO has retired and was not available for questioning.
Nevertheless, four of five grades were increased without
apparent documentation.
D- DATA/TEEND ANALYSIS OF AHABI FEES
Data from eighteen CPAF contracts, representing four
different Project Offices, were obtained for review and
analysis. These eighteen contracts had 117 individual eval-
uation periods. The approximate total cost estimate for
these eighteen contracts exceeded approximately 32.271
billion. As a condition of making the data available, the
researcher agreed to sanitize the data so that it would not
be possible to identify any particular data set to the asso-
ciated contract or Program Office. These data, tabulated in
raw form, are presented in Apperdix E.
The data were examined in three ways; by individual
contract, by Program Office, a Ed finally, by combining all
data from every contract into a single data set. Each of
these three combinations will be discussed in the following
sections.
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1. Data From In dividaal CoLtracts
The evaluation period for each of the eighteen
contracts was three months in duration. Statistical data
were extracted from the raw data found in Appendix E for
each contract and are presented in Table 4 These data
included the minimum score awarded as a percentage of the
amount of funds available in the award fee pool, the maximum
score awarded as a percentage of the amount of funds avail-
able in the award fee pool, the statistical mean, the stan-
dard deviation, and the median of the amount of the award
fee earned by the contractor. In addition, a correlation
was derived between the "age" of the contract and the award
fee earned. As the contractor's performance progressed and
gained experience, was the contractor's behavior modified in
response to the evaluation criteria and feedback provided by
the FDO? If this was the case, one would expect it to be
reflected by a strong positive correlation. On the ether
hand, if the contractor's performance did not improve, this
may be reflected by a lower award fee as the contract
progresses and would represent a negative correlation. The
statistical data presented in Table 4 have been tabulated by
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As can be seen from Table 4, generalized statements
cannot be arrived at concerning individual CPAF contracts.
The minimum scores range from 29.4 percent to a high of 95
percent, while the maximum scores run from a low of 43.4
percent to a perfect score of 100 percent. It is not
intended to select a particular contract for comment;
however it should be noted that a score of 100 percent
implies that the contractor did everything right! While
certainly not impossible, a score of 100 percent raises
questions about the quality of the evaluation criteria and
almost mandates a close examination of the criteria. The
evaluation criteria which result in a perfect score implies
that only the contractor's strengths were targeted in the
evaluation criteria, and perhaps other areas of potential
weaknesses should be examined for evaluation criteria in
subsequent CPAF contracts with the contractor in order to
provide proper motivation. In the particular case where a
contractor earned a perfect sccre, this 100 percent grade
did appear toward the end of contract performance. Figure
5.1 shows that as the contractor gained experience and
continued to be motivated to achieve higher scores, the
scores did in fact increase over time, culminating in a
perfect score at the end of contract performance. This is
one example of how the "carrot and stick" approach to moti-
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Figure 5.1 Progression of Award Fees.
The mean scores ranged from a low of 38.7 percent to
a high of 96.5 percent, while the standard deviations ranged
from a low of 1.3 percent to a high of 12.4 percent. The
correlations ranged from a strong positive correlation of
99.8 percent to a strong negative correlation of -88-0
percent. Figure 5.2 shows graphically a positive correla-



















Figure 5-2 Award Fee Data flith Positive Correlation.
the contractor progresses through performance, gains experi-
ence, and remains motivated to improve, this is reflected in
higher award fees. On the other hand. Figure 5.3 demon-
strates a situation with a negative correlation between time
and the amount of award fee earned. As the contractor
progresses through time and does not remain motivated,
resulting in deteriorating performance, lower award fees




















Figure 5.3 Award Fee Data Rith Negative Correlation.
2 • Program Office Da ta
Data for the eighteen individual contracts found in
Appendix E were combined into their respective four Program
Offices. Statistical data were then extracted by the
researcher by Program Office and follows Table U format.
Table 5 presents these data.
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Program Office number four is represented by ten
contracts. Program Office number one by six contracts, and
Program Offices two and three by only one contract each. It
is interesting to examine the histograms from Program
Offices one and four. These histograms are presented in
Pigures 5.4 and 5.5 and represent the amount of award fee
earned expressed as a percentage of the amount of fee avail-
able in the pool. Histograms from Program Offices twc and
three are not provided because of the relatively small
















Figure 5.4 Program Office Number One Histogram.
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Figure 5.5 Program Office Number Four Histogram.
number of total evaluation periods available in the two
contracts involved; no significant trends are evident. The
reader may obtain this information, if so desired, by
reviewing Tables 13 and 1 4 in Appendix E. In examining
Table 5, the researcher could detect no significant data or
trends. Data in Program Office's two and three must be
discounted because they represent single contracts rather
than combined contracts as in Program Offices one and four.
When examining the contract data in Program Offices one and
four, there is no significant correlation between the "age"
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It cannot te concluded from these two Program Offices that
as the contractor's performance progresses, there is a posi-
tive motivational impact on the contractor which would be
reflected in higher award fees earned (with a strong posi-
tive correlation between time and award fee earned) . One
possible conclusion is that there is little or no positive
correlation between time and the amount of award fee earned
for any single contractor within individual Program Offices;
indeed. Program Office four shows a negative correlation.
An examination of Figures 5-4 and 5.5 show that the
two Program Offices tend to skew the amount of award fee
earned, expressed as a percentage of award fee available in
the pool, to the high side of the scale, i.e., 80 percent
and above. This is particularly evident in Figure 5.5 and,
as will be seen later, this is also true throughout all
Program Offices.
3. Combined C ontract Data
Data found in Appendix E were combined into one
single data set from which statistical data could be
extracted. These data are presented in Table 6 The histo-
gram for this data set is presented in Figure 5.6 and repre-
sents the amount of award fee earned expressed as a
percentage of the amount of fee available in the pool.
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TABLE 6
Statistical Data From All Contracts Combined
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Median
Score Score Score Deviation Score Correl,
.294 1.000 .839 .127 .877 .247
As can be seen from Table 6 , there exists a slight
correlation (24.7 percent) between the "age" of the contract
and amount of award fee earned. The general tendency
appears to be to increase the anount of the award fee earned
as contractor performance progresses. As seen earlier, this
generalization cannot and should not be applied to indi-
vidual contracts or individual Erogram Offices.
The histogram shown in Figure 5.6 shows a definite
skewing of the award fees to the high side (i.e. , 80 percent
and above) for all contracts combined. It is logical to
assume that in most cases these high awards are the direct
result of a skewing to the high side of recommended grades
to the FDC from the PEB (assuming that the FDO does not
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Figure 5.6 Histogram for Combined Contract Data.
unilaterally increase the award fee with or without proper
justification) . There appears to be a general tendency to
award high grades.
The question then becomes "What is a high grade?"
Twelve of the eighteen contracts reviewed had a three
percent base fee and a twelve percent award fee. An
"average" grade has not been defined. However, if an
average grade were defined as 50 percent, then an average
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3% Ease Fee + .50(12^ Award Fee) = 9% .(5.1)
total fee would be as shown in equation 5.1 If "average"
performance were to equate to an 80 percent award fee (as it
appears to be the case with award fees skewed to the high
side), then an average total fee would jump to 12.6 percent,
3% Base Fee + .80(12% Award Fee) = 12.6% (5.2)
equation 5.2 shows this. With a 90 percent "average" score,
the total fee earned would be 13.8 percent. Equation 5.3
demonstrates this.
This skewing of award fees to the high side can
create problems for the Contracting Officer at a later date
3% Base Fee + .90(12% Award Fee) = 13.8% (5.3)
during subsequent contract negctiations. As a particular
project matures, the type of contract is more than likely to
migrate from a cost-reimburse cent type of contract to a
fixed-price type of contract. As this occurs and the
contractor assumes a greater share of the risk, the
contractor should expect to be compensated for the greater
assumption of risk through higher profit (or fee) . If the
contractor has been earning 12 to 1U percent on a CPAF
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contract, it may be impossible to get the contractor to
agree on a profit rate of 10 or 1 1 percent on subsequent
fixed-price contracts. Although the researcher does not
propose that 10 to 11 percent should be the standard profit
on a fixed-price type of contract, some interviewees indi-
cated that there does seem to be a "10 percent mentality"
when discussing fixed-price profit rates. As shown in equa-
tion 5.1, an average grade of 50 percent would result in a 9
percent total fee, making it easier to transition to a fixed
price type of contract with a profit rate of 10 to 11
percent.
Although weighted guidelines do not apply to CPAF
contracts, [Ref. 86] a brief examination of the weighted
guidelines was conducted to determine the impact on the fee
if weighted guidelines did apply. The percentage range for
fee objectives for a CPAF contract was selected by the
researcher as 1.5 to 3 percent, to reflect assumption of
cost risk for a cost reimbursement type contract with a
"relatively" high degree of risk, and 4 to 6 percent for a
FPIF contract with multiple incentives. If all weighted
guideline elements, with the exception of contract cost
risk, are held constant, then the difference in fee/profit
can be attributed to only th€ assumption of cost risk.
Using a measurement base of $100,000 for simplicity, the
CPAF contract fee would be between $1,500 and $3,000, and
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the FPIF profit would be betweer $4,000 and $6,000. Notice
that in all cases, the CPAF fee would be below the FPIF
profit objective. When the project then migrates from a
CPAF contract to a fixed- price type of contract, the
contractor would then realize an increase in profit/fee. In
reality, this is not the case when the CPAF fee is between
12 to 14 percent and the Goverrment attempts to negotiate a
profit objective of 10 to 11 percent on a fixed-price type
of contract.
It appears logical to conclude then that the general
tendency is to award grades which are too high. As shown in
Table 6, the mean (or average) award fee was nearly 84
percent, with a median award fee earned of nearly 88
percent.
E. CONCIDSION
Proper administration of CPAF contracts is critical to
the success of the award fee concept. For CPAF contracts to
succeed, the concept of a post-performance subjective evalu-
ation by the Government must have the support of the
contractor. For this to occur, the contractor must feel
that a fair and eguitable evaluation is being conducted.
Because of this, the PEB must have representation from the
on-site office as a member of the Board.
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This idea of a fair and equitable evaluation is also a
two-edged sword. The evaluation must also be fair and equi-
table to the Government, As pointed out earlier, the poten-
tial exists for the lEO to abuse his authority. In the one
instance cited earlier, the FDC appears to have abused his
position by raising the recommended grades of the PEB
without documented justification. The reverse is also
possible; the FDO could also lower the recommended grades.
In either case, controls over these possibilities are
needed. Such controls should include the FDO justifying his
actions in writing and filing this documentation for future
reference.
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VI- CONCIOSIOHS AN^ RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCIDSIONS
The following conclusions apply to this research effort:
1 - ImErpyements to the award fee determination proces s
are needed. The process needs to be improved for two
reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter IV, section
B, CPAF contracts are being criticized as "give away"
programs, particularly when roll over provisions are
used which are considered "gifts to the contractor"
and allow the contractor "multiple bites at the
apple." The second reason the award fee determina-
tion process needs to be improved is that CPAF
contracts do not have the full support of those who
currently set policy. As discussed in Chapter II,
section E, and in Chapter 17, section B, this lack of
support, or confidence, is reflected in increased
restrictions on the use of CPAF contracts.
Specifically, these increased restrictions include a
threshold of S25 million on the use of CPAF
contracts, and that use of carry forward provisions
for unearned award fees are expressly prohibited
without prior approval from Chief of Naval Material.
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2. The base fee is generally too hi^h. As discussed in
Chapter IV, section A, the majority of Government
personnel interviewed indicated that the hase fee
should be three percent. However, these individuals
seem to have lost sight of the basics and could not
logically support a three percent base fee, other
than "it's authorized in the FAR" or "it appears to
be the standard." As Dr. Meiners indicated, "the
base fee, when originally conceived, was intended
only to cover the contractor's unallowable costs,
which historically have been two percent." This
naturally assumes that there is a potential for the
contractor to earn none of the fee available in the
award fee pool. Dr. Meiners also indicated that
"there is no other type of contract where funds are
set aside specifically to cover unallowable
expenses." These expenses are normally covered by
the standard profit or fee the contractor earns. The
use of a base fee should only be for those situations
where the Government and the contractor are so
concerned with and anticipate a large number of
uncertainties that the contractor will earn only the
base fee. This would certainly be the exception
rather than the rule.
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3 • The cur ren t res trie t ion s on the use of r ell over
provisions should be eased. As discussed in Chapter
IV, section B, circumstances may exist which favor
use of roll over provisions. Ose of roll over provi-
sions should be an optioE to provide management flex-
ibility to the Program Manager.
^ • Performance ratings and performance evalu atio n
criteria are too subjective. As seen in Chapter IV
/
section C, the most commonly used performance rating
is the adjective-type standard rating system which
indexes a performance quality adjective and corre-
sjjonding explanation to a percentage of the potential
award fee available during the evaluation period.
Similarly, evaluation criteria tends to be too broad
and not well-defined. This leads to confusion and
exposes the award fee determination process to
criticism.
5 . The following four crit eria must first be examined in
determining the length of the evaluation period ;
Projected leng th of the contract, contrac t
complexity, size of the contract, and administr ativ e
require ments. As discussed in Chapter IV, section D,
there is no cookbook solution to determining the
length of the evaluation period. Such a decision,
however, should not be made if any of the above four
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elements are not first considered in the decision-
making process,
6 . Award fee computation formulas have the 2ot en tial ex
awarding the contractor for iinsat isfactor,^ perform-
ance and can he difficult to understand. As seen in
Chapter IV, section E, the criteria in selectin^j a
formula are that it should be relatively easy to
understand, leaves little room for confusion, is not
subject to interpretation, and does not reward the
contractor for unsatisfactory performance.
7- A fair and ob jecti ve evaluation of the contr acto r
£^Si]i4£§s that the Performance Evaluation Board have
on-site field office representation. As seen in
Chapter V, section B, on-site representation reduces
needless criticism and problems for the PSB. One
contract reviewed lacked on-site representation on
the PEB , and was the subject of severe criticism for
not being well-balanced.
8. The potential exists for the Fee Determination
Official to modify award fee r ecom mendations withou t
apparent jus tification. As seen in Chapter V,
section C, in one contract examined the FDO unilater-
ally raised four of five recommended grades without
apparent justification. Although the exception
rather than the rule, the FDO has the authority to
151
unilaterally adjust reconmended grades from the PEB.
While there may be sufficient justification for the
modifications, this information was not available
either in the contract file or from those in the
Program Office.
9 . Development of a training 2L23.EAE for CP AF cont ract s
w]li£]l can be expor ted to various commands is ne eded .
As discussed in Chapter II, section F, one of the
disadvantages of CPAF contracts is the complexity
inherent in administering the contract- A formalized
training program for CPAF contracts currently does
not exist.
10- Aw^£^ fees provi de d und^r CPAF contracts have a
iendencx to be too high . As discussed in Chapter V,
section D, the average award fee is nearly 84 percent
and the median award fee is nearly 88 percent. In a
contract with a three percent base fee and a twelve
percent award fee, the total fee earned by the
contractor (given a recommended award fee of 84
percent) is over thirteen percent. This creates
serious problems when the program migrates from a




The following recommendaticcs are appropriate for this
study
:
I* IMt Ik^ ^se f ee be zerc, as a general rule, unless
strong evidence exists which su££orts the use of a
base fee between zero and three p ercent. This recom-
mendation would accomplish two things. First, it
would result in the total fee earned by the
contractor to be lower. For example, if the award
fee pool were 12 percent with a base fee of three
percent, total fee earned by the contractor would be
12.6 percent with an award fee grade of 80 percent.
However, if the base fee were zero, and the award fee
pool were 15 percent, total fee earned with an 80
percent award fee grade would be only 12 percent.
This would make it easier to transition from a cost-
reimbursement type of contract to a fixed-price type
of contract. Secondly, use of a zero base fee would
reduce criticism that award fee contracts are "give
away" programs. This recommendation is significant
because it contradicts "traditional" attitudes toward
use of base fees and requires that attitudes be
adjusted throughout the acquisition community. This
recommendation may be implemented through
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pxomulgation of a policy statement or instruction at
the Systems Command level.
2 • That the Chi ef of Naval Material ease the curren t
restrictions on use of roil over Ero visions for the
award fee £ool. This recommendation would return
management flexibility to the Program Manager. This
recommendation is significant because roll over
provisions have been, and will continue to be,
controversial. Implementation would require a modi-
fication to current NAVHAT policy in NAVMAT
Instruction 4280. 1A.
3 • That performance ratings use only numerical des crip -
io£s rather than numeric/a d;jective ratings. This
recommendation makes the award fee determination
process less subjective, and thus more objective, by
creating relativity for the performance rating when
compared against a perfect score of 100 percent.
This recommendation is also controversial because
there are those who favor use of combined numeric and
adjective rating systems. This recommendation may
also be implemented through promulgation of a policy
statement or instruction at the Systems Command
level.
^ • That guidan ce be promul ga ted outlining, the desire d
:h of detail for evaluation criteria. As the
15U
evaluation criteria becomes more detailed, the
sub jectiveness inherent in the award fee determina-
tion process is reduced, thereby eliminating some of
the criticism being levied against award fees. This
recommendation is significant because the tendency is
to promulgate broad, ncn-specific guidance leaving
room for interpretation and adjustments to individual
programs. In the researcher's opinion, evaluation
criteria is one area where detailed guidance is
appropriate, and may be promulgated through a policy
statement or instruction at the Systems Command
level.
5. That "logistics supportability" be included as a
fourth evaluation element. This recommendation would
increase the number of evaluation elements most
commonly used to four. These elements would be
technical/management performance, schedule perform-
ance, cost control, and logistics supportability.
This recommendation is necessary to give logistics
supportability proper recognition and support from
management, and can be implemented through a policy
statement or instruction at the Systems Command
level.
6. That luidance be promulgated "hi:3hly. recommending"
on-site representa tion on the Performance Evalu atio n
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Board. Although lack of on-site PEB representation
occurred in only one contract and may be an isolated
incident, this recommeEdation closes a significant
loop-hole in current guidance. This recommendation
would help prevent future "apparent lack of fair and
objective evaluations" and thus help eliminate a
source of award fee criticism. Implementation is
possible through a policy statement or instruction at
the Systems Ccmmand level-
That if the Fee Determination Offi cial should 0£t to
modify the score s recoamended b;y the Performa nce
Evaluation Bo ard and/or the award fee, the re ason s
and logic for this acticn should be well-docum ente d
in writing and retained in the contract file for
future refere nce. The IDO should retain the flexi-
bility to disagree with the PEB and modify the award
fees. The responsibility to determine the award fee
is inherent in the position of the EDO. However,
this recommendation will help limit the potential for
abuse of this authority, even if all that it accom-
plishes is to make the EDO think twice prior to
taking such action. This recommendation is signifi-
cant because action must be taken to eliminate the
potential for even "apparent abuses of the EDO's
authority." Implementation is possible through a
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policy statement or instruction at the Systems
Command level.
8 . That a t raini n^ E£.oa.£§:l l2£ CP AF contracts be d evel -
Ofc^ed which can be ex£2£i^ %.9. 22H3.nds using CFAF
contracts. Such a program should include contractor
motivation factors, evaluation criteria and methods,
responsibilities of those who monitor contractor
performance and provide input and testimony to the
PEB, as well as other factors unique to CPAF
contracts. This recommendation fills a void and true
need for those who use CPAF contracts in the field,
and is significant because no such program currently
exists. Ideally, implementation can be achieved
through the Chief of Naval Material providing funds
for an educational institution to develop and export
such a program to the field-
9 • That guidance be pro mul^at ed which identifie s grad e
structures for "average" performance. As seen
earlier, award fees provided under CPAF contracts
have a tendency to be tco high. FDOs must gain an
awareness of the impact high award fees have or the
future and make necessarj adjustments. This recom-
mendation would result in lower fees earned by the
contractor who is "average" where "average" is
defined as 50 percent rather than the current 8U
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percent. This recommendation would also help reduce
the criticism that CPAF contracts are "give away"
programs. The significance of such a recommendation
is apparent. Defense contractors can be expected to
react negatively to such an action. However, if the
contractor is to be fairly compensated (fair for both
the Government and the contractor) for the assumption
of risk/ the lowering cf CPAF total fees is appro-
priate. Without the promulgation of such guidance,
the skewing of award fees to the high side will prob-
ably continue and may in fact grow. This will
continue to make it difficult to migrate from a cost-
reimbursement type of contract to a fixed-price type
of contract. Implementation of this recommendation
is perhaps best through a policy statement or
instruction issued by NA'VMAT.
C. AH2HERS TO RESEABCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the key characteristics of the award fee
determination process under CPAF contracts for aajor
Weapon Systems acquisition and how might this process
be improved?
Identification of the key characteristics of the
award fee determination process is really a two step
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process. The first stej involves an examination of
pre-award activities and the development and struc-
turing of contract elements which influence the award
fee determination process. These elements and activ-
ities include the formulation of the base fee, deter-
mining how the award fee pool is to be used,
formulating the evaluation criteria and performance
ratings, determining the length of the evaluation
period, and finally, development of an appropriate
formula to compute the fee. The second step involves
contract administration functions in terms of evalu-
ating performance and fee determination procedures.
This step includes an examination of the PEB composi-
tion and proceedings as well as the role and
authority of the FDO. This process can be improved
through the implementation of the recommendations of
this study which include:
a) Use of a base fee of zero as a general rule;
b) Easing of the current restrictions on the use of
roll over provisions;
c) Performance ratings should use only numerical
descriptors;
d) Use of more detailed evaluation criteria;
e) Include "logistics supportability" as an evalua-
tion element;
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f) Promulgating guidance "highly recommending"
on-site representation on the PEB;
g) That the PDO be required to document in writing
any modifications to the recommended award fee;
h) That a training program for CPAF contracts be
developed; and
i) That guidance be promulgated which identifies
grade structures for "average" performance.
2. What are the basic concepts and assumptions in the
award fee determination process?
The basic concept is that the award fee determination
process is a unilateral subjective evaluation,
conducted by the Government following contractor
performance, which is net subject to dispute by the
contractor. The basic assumption is that the evalua-
tion is fair and equitable, both to the contractor
and to the Government.
3. What are the key criteria used to evaluate contractor
performance and how have these criteria been
"Utilized?
Three criteria have been most often used. These are
technical/management performance, schedule perform-
ance, , and cost control. Some contracts have broken
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out "management performance" as a separate element.
In addition, "design-to-cost" has been used at times.
A fourth element, logistics supportabilit y, is recom-
mended for consideration as one of the key evaluation
criteria as this area grows in importance. The
problem with use of all criteria generally has been
that they are vague ard not well-defined. More
detailed information in the criteria can reduce seme
of the subjectivity in the process and add an element
of objectivity, which is needed to reduce criticism.
4. What are the significant issues and problems in
contractor performance evaluation?
In addition to vague and not well-defined evaluation
criteria, formal training for those directly respon-
sible for providing input to the PEB and FDO does not
exist. The potential exists for the FDO to abuse his
authority and either increase or decrease the recom-
mendations of the PEB without apparent justification.
Lack of on-site representation on the PEB is also
another potential problem. Another issue involves
determination of the length of the performance evalu-
ation period.
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5. What guidelines are used by the FDO in determining
the quality of contractor's performance and amount of
award fee?
Formal guidelines provided by the Naval Material
Command leave maximum flexibility and use of profes-
sional judgement to the IDO [Eef- 95].
The FDO shall, based oe the recommendation of the
PEB and any other pertinent information known,
determine the award fee for the period in
question.
6. What input does the contractor have in the award fee
determination process?
Very little. The evaluation criteria is subject to
negotiation prior to formalization of the contract.
Once the process is in place, most PEBs allow the
contractor the opportunity to make a presentation, if
desired, to the PEB which is followed by questions
presented to the contractor resulting from board
members review of Government and contractor input.
7. What modifications should be made to improve the fee
determination process?
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The award fee determination process can be improved
through implementation of the recommendations of this
study and particularly by:
a) Use of a base fee of zero as a general rule;
b) Easing of the restrictions on the use of roll over
provisions;
c) Use of only numerical descriptors for performance
ratings;
d) Use of more detailed evaluation criteria;
e) Including "logistic supportability" as an evalua-
tion element;
f) Promulgating guidance "highly recommending"
on-site representation on the PEB;
g) That the lEO be required to document in writing
any modifications to the recommended award fee;
h) That a training program for CPAF contracts be
developed; and
i) That guidance be promulgated which identifies
grade structures for "average" performance.
8. Hew are funds utilized which remain in the award fee
pool after the award fee determination decision is
made?
Two schools of thought exist, and both are currently
in use. The first is that once the contractor is
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awarded funds from the pool, any funds which remain
in the pool should be lest as far as the contractor
is concerned. These funds would then be recouped by
the Government and used for other purposes. The
second school of thought is that a percentage of the
funds which remain in the pool be rolled forward into
subsequent evaluation periods, thus giving the
contractor a "second bite at the apple".
9. The amount of the award fee is limited by the size of
the award fee pool. Measuring the award fee as a
percentage of the award fee pool, what trends, if
any, are evident?
Generalized statements about individual contracts are
not possible. As a contractor progresses through
contract performance and gains experience, a positive
correlation between evaluation period and award fee
earned should result. This should occur because the
contractor "learns" how to respond to the
Government's feedback, iiakes the appropriate adjust-
ments, and shows improved performance during subseq-
uent evaluations with a payoff of higher award fees
earned. This indeed occurred in several situations.
However, negative correlations also were evident.
When examined in a combined data set, a definite
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skewing of award fees to the high side (i.e., 80
percent and ahove) occurred. The average award fee
was nearly 8U percent and the median award fee was
nearly 88 percent for the combined data set. Award
fees this high/ when the contract has a three percent
base fee and a twelve percent award fee provision,
results in a total fee earned of between twelve and
fourteen percent/ making it difficult to migrate to a
fixed price type of contract with a target profit
objective of ten or eleven percent.
D. EECOHHENDATIONS FOE FDETHEE STUDY
1. That a cost-benefit analysis be conducted to measure
the benefits and costs of administering CPAF
contracts. If the cost of administering a C?AF
contract is in excess of any benefits which may
accrue to the Government, a contract form other than
CPAF should be utilized. The problem then becomes
one of how to measure the benefits and costs of
administration.
2. Examine the development of a training program and
manual for CPAF contracts for both contract formula-
tion and administration.
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Development of a model tc be used in identifying the
appropriate weightings to be applied to the evalua-
tion criteria during specific phases of the project.
How much weight, for example, should be applied to





1. What is the purpose, as yoa perceive it, of a cost
plus award fee type contract?
2. Do you think that costs are adequately considered in
the evaluation of the award fee?
3. Consider the proposal that it be mandatory for cost
controls to be at least 50% of the award fee evalua-
tion criteria. Vlhat is your reaction to such a
proposal?
4. What do you think could most contribute to cost over-
runs on a CPAF contract and what should be done about
it?
5. What level should the base fee be set at? (i.e., 0%
,
2%, 5%, etc.) What criteria should be used in making
this determination?
6. What criteria is used to determine the amount of the
award fee for the evaluation period?
7. How long should the award fee evaluation period be?
What criteria should be used in making this
determination?
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8. What do you see as the key characteristics of the
award fee determination process?
9. What do you see as the basic concepts and assumptions
in the award fee deter nination process? (Descriptive
response)
10. Tlhat do you see as the najor factors/characteristics
inherent in the process and how do they contribute to
the award fee? (Evaluative response)
11. T?hat do you see as the key criteria to be used to
evaluate contractor performance and how have these
criteria been ntilized?
12. What are the significant issues and problems in
contractor performance evaluation?
13. What input does the contractor have in the award fee
determination process? What input should the
contractor have?
14. Why do award fee provisions generate controversy in
the contract environment?
15. How do you view the award fee determination process
and what are your likes and dislikes?
16. What criteria are available to evaluate contractor
performance?
17. How are funds which reEain in the award fee pool,
after the award fee determination decision is made,
utilized? How should they be utilized?
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18. If you could do two or three things to modify and
improve the award fee determination process, what
would they be?
B. FEE DETERMINATION OFFICIAL
1. What positions and grades comprise the Performance
Evaluation Board (PEB) ? Do any members of the PEE
represent the on-site office? If not, why not?
2. What is your opinion of the quality of the input from
the PEB? How could the input be improved?
3. How often do you disagree wixih the PEB input and
recommendations?
4. Consider the proposal making it mandatory that the
PEB be composed of some representation from the
on-site office. What is your opinion of that
proposal? What kind of representation should this
be? What positions/backgrounds should the represen-
tatives have? (QA, auditing, finance, production,
engineers, etc.)
.
5- What kind of influence does the contractor's input
have on the fee determination?
C. POLICY
1.
What guidelines have teen published to assist the
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CONTRACTOR PEPJORJ^IANCE EVALUATION REPORT
(J) Example of Contractor t^erformance Evaluation Report.
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The following evaluation criteria considerations were
adapted, in part, from Naval Sea Systems Command Draft
Instruction 4700, "Surface Ship Availability Contracts," tut
may be modified and utilized, where appropriate, with nearly
any type of CPAF contract for major weapons systems
acquisition.
a- Technical/Management Performance
Major considerations in the technical and
management performance elements are:
1. The effectiveness of the management organization in
problem anticipation and avoidance, as well as imple-
mentation of timely corrective action in problem
areas which could impact successful completion of the
contract should be evaluated. Consideration should
be given to the prevention of schedule slippage or
cost escalation through the use of budgeting tech-
niques, material selection, subcontractor utiliza-
tion, and manpower loading.
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2. The responsiveness of the purchasing organization in
obtaining and providing the parts, material and
equipment necessary to laintain schedules should be
evaluated. Factors such as the number of jobs held
up because of lack of material, cost savings obtained
through the use of economic purchasing techniques,
and the avoidance of expenditures on such things as
premium transportation costs should be considered.
The selection of cost effective materials, when
several approved options exist, should also be
considered.
3. The responsiveness of the engineering organization in
issuing drawings, sketches, work item specifications,
technical instructions, and similar documents
required by the contract administrators should be
evaluated. Use of simple solutions and economic work
methods for jot accomplishment should be considered.
The number of jobs held up for lack of engineering
information and rapidity with which engineering prob-
lems are resolved should also be considered. The
degree of rework caused by inadequate contractor
technical documentations and solutions to rework
requirements should be considered.
4. Subcontractor Management: The ability of the
contractor to select, enhance competition, and
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effectively manage subccntractors, both material/
service vendors and on site subcontractors, should be
evaluated. The schedule/cost impact of jobs held up
for vendor provided material, technical data and/or
delays caused by on site subcontractors should be
considered. Efforts made to keep subcontractor costs
to a minimum should also be considered.
5. Cofiguration Control: Effectiveness in obtaining
materials and performing repairs and alterations in
conformance with approved drawings and technical data
should be evaluated. Tiirely submission of configura-
tion control data to the Government should also be of
consideration.
6. Data Management; The effectiveness of contractor
utilization of Government Furnished Information (GFI)
should be evaluated. The contractor should be evalu-
ated on his effectiveness in detecting consequential
technical errors in GFI prior to production, and on
the effectiveness in working with the Government to
resolve such problems before they have an adverse
cost impact. The contractor should be judged on his
ability to apply GFI to engineering of work, and use
of GFI in installation, test, and checkout of
completed work.
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7. Quality Assurance: The effectiveness of the quality
assurance organization in fulfilling the in-process,
as well as the at-completion, quality requirements of
the contract should te assessed. Effectiveness in
identifying and correcting quality deficiencies and
their causes in a timely manner should be considered.
The contractor's manageient approach to fulfilling
the quality requirements of the contract, cleanliness
of interface work areas, and as-found testing
requirements should also be considered.
8. Effectiveness of the contractor's ability to control
costs and to avoid unnecessary cost increases should
be evaluated. Particular emphasis should be placed
on the contractor's ability to maintain the initial
budget and to make cost effective decisions with
respect to technical requirements^ schedule, and
quality control.
9. Change Orders; The tinely submission of condition
reports by the contractor, cooperation in negotiation
of changes, and willingness to provide information
needed by the Government for timely negotiations
should be considered.
10. Liaison with the Project Manager and other
Government representatives should be evaluated. This
includes stability of the contractor project
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organization, established management procedures, and
contractor attitudes.
11. The use of Facilities Capital Cost of Money for
productivity enhancing capital investments should be
considered.
12. Contractor personnel management procedures should be
evaluated, including the minimization of turnover,
training programs, and apprentice programs.
13- Integrated logistics support efforts should be eval-
uated, including provisions of technical documenta-
tion, repair parts ordering, technical manuals, and
training.
b. Schedule Performance
Major considerations in structuring evaluation
criteria for schedule performance include:
1. Effectiveness in establishing and maintaining a
timely and efficient scheduling system should be
evaluated. Particular emphasis should be placed on
establishment and timely updating of a scheduling
system that properly integrates contractor furnished
material. Government furnished material and produc-
tion labor, including subcontractor efforts, into a
rational and cost effective plan for completion of
the contract.
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2. Effectiveness in meeting preplanned milestones should
be evaluated. Particular consideration should be
given to the contractor's ability to maintain
adequate progress in anticipation of completion of
milestones.
3. Effectiveness in measuring schedule progress using
preplanned milestones aid critical paths should be
evaluated. Communication with appropriate Government
representatives regarding appraisal of perforioance
related to critical paths should be highlighted.
4. Effectiveness in the recovery from and the correction
of causes leading to missed events should be
considered.
5. Effectiveness in integrating Government work items
into contractor schedules should be evaluated.
Particular emphasis should be placed on the coordina-
tion with appropriate Government representatives of
milestones with joint responsibility.
6. Effectiveness of manpower utilization to meet plan-
ning and production schedules should be evaluated.
This should include items such as methods and proce-
dures to reduce the amounts of premium time used to
minimize time lost on the job and between jobs, and
to perform work with a reasonable number of qualified
personnel. The contractor's effectiveness in
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controlling f luctuatioiiS of manpower requirements, so
as to enhance stabilization of overhead rates, should
also be considered.
c. Cost Performance
Major considerations in structuring evaluation
criteria for cost performance include:
1. Effectiveness in meeting the cost performance plan
submitted in the cost performance report should he
evaluated. Results of cost avoidance practices
should also be considered.
2. Consideration should be given to the timely and accu-
rate submission of the cost performance report and
cost status of funds report.
3. Effectiveness in identifying early cost and schedule
problems, including timely variance analysis, as well




PRESENTATION OF 5WARD FEE DATA
Data from eighteen CPAF contracts representing four
different Project Offices were obtained for review and anal-
ysis. The approximate total cost estimate for these
eighteen contracts exceeded $2,271 billion. These data were
provided to the researcher ty evaluation period, and
included the amount of funds available in the award fee pool
to be awarded during the evaluation period and the amount
actually awarded. From these data the researcher calculated
the percentage of award fee earned. These data are
presented in the following tables. As a condition of making
the data available, the researcher agreed to sanitize the
data so that it would not be possible to identify any
particular data set to the associated contract or Project




Contract Number 1 Award Fee Data


















Contract Number 2 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE ATJAED FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD EOOL EARNED EARNED
1 766,644 613,315 .80
2 808,245 678,926 .84
3 1,040,021 834,018 . 85
U 1, 183,159 1,017,517 . 86
5 1,729,845 1,383,876 . 80
6 2, 192,713 1,798,025 .82
7 2,728,907 2,046,681 .75
8 3,445,840 2,963,423 .86
9 2,658,280 2,286,121 . 85
10 2,244,326 1,840,347 . 82
11 2,171,098 1,780,300 . 82
12 2,242,872 1,973,728 .88
13 3,443,047 2,961,020 . 86
ia 1,902,860 1,427,145 .75
15 2,190,540 1,971,486 . 90
16 1,647,348 1,482,613 .90
17 1,969,844 1,871,352 . 95
18 1,579,241 1,500,279 . 95
19 896,459 851,636 .95
20 864,613 864,613 1. 00
21 232,208 225,242 .97
22 539,401 528,612 .98
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TABLE 9
Contract Number 3 Award Fee Data
AHAED FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD FOOL EARNED EARNED
1 1,489,600 1,385,328 .93
2 1,550,400 1,426,368 . 92
3 1,088,320 1,001,254 .92
4 1,500,955 1,350,859 . 90
5 1,575,201 1,433,433 . 91
6 1,845,451 1,679,460 .91
7 2,057,383 1,872,219 . 91
8 2,310,171 2,125,357 .92
9 2,442,299 2,295,761 .94
10 2,306,236 2,121,737 . 92
11 2,002,590 1,782,305 .89
12 1,683,578 1,481,548 .88
13 • 1,725,049 1,483,542 .86
14 1,651,687 1,387,417 .84
1
15 2,050,300 1,947,785 .95
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TABLE 10








































Contract Number 5 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
EEIOD ECOL EARNED EARNED
1 1,834,960 1,688, 163 . 92
2 1,834,960 1,669,814 .91
3 1,870,717 1,683,645 .90
a 2,974,795 1,805,072 . 37
5 2,343,169 2,108,852 . 90
6 2,871,876 2,613,407 .91
7 2,238,862 2,014,975 . 90
8 2,547,463 2,292,716 .90
9 2,476,273 2,357,648 . 37
10 2,590,823 2,357,648 .91
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TABLE 12
Contract Nunber 6 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 1,834,960 1,688,163 .92
2 1,834,960 1,669,814 .91
3 1,870,717 1,683,645 .90
4 2,974,795 1,805,072 .87













Contract Number 7 Award Fee Data
AWAED FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 1,2U0,627 589,844 .475
2 1,426,753 910,342 .638
3 1,749,991 1,161,001 .663
4 3,037,297 2,027,886 .667
5 2,573,994 1,647,416 .640
6 2,761,805 1,838,554 .665
7 3,672,910 2,674,916 .728
8 3,006,110 2,005,911 .667
9 4,693,145 3,887,576 .828
10 5,342,630 3,153,124 .890
11 2^672,641 2,184,013 .817
12 1,955,420 1,480,196 .757
13 606,591 298,077 .491
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TABLE 14
Contract Number 8 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 2,737,110 1,721,095 .629








Contract Number 9 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 279,191 121,253 .434
2 600,614 260,847 .434
3 1,095,021 321,936 .294
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TABLE 16





















Contract Number 11 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 385,202 269,671 .700
2 733,961 597,664 .762
3 660,546 556,774 .843
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TABLE 18






















Contract Number 13 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 529,278 461,213 .871
2 572,643 423,756 .740
3 764,297 615,030 .805
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TABLE 20
Contract Number 14 Award Fee Data
AI^AED FEE AWAED FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 875,436 737,905 .843
2 555,357 435,568 .784
3 874,843 762,342 .871
TABLE 21
Contract Number 15 Auard Fee Data
AfiAED FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 492,355 421,997 .857
2 537,297 412,966 .769
3 964,537 738,546 .766
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TABLE 22
Contract Number 16 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE AWARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 748,427 656,370 .877
2 1,074,847 968,437 .900
3 1,486,457 1,458,851 .981
TABLE 23
Contract Number 17 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE ASARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 708,388 564,585 .797
2 997,977 817,685 .820
3 1,311,929 1,139,864 .869
192
TABLE 24
Contract Number 18 Award Fee Data
AWARD FEE ARARD FEE PERCENTAGE
PERIOD POOL EARNED EARNED
1 306,351 258,254 .843
2 342,904 301,756 .830
3 1,216,539 712,527 .586
L _
4 1,476,808 1,002,753 .680
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